Woke Salaryman recently posted this comic article in response to comments towards a previous post about workplace ‘politics’. I really like the realism, the clarity and conviction behind their work. I think it is great that they call out the naivety of those who thinks that they can be ‘above’ politics at work but I’m writing this post because I want to add a more nuance layer to the conversation.
I think Singapore, by and large, have always been sensitive to overt kinds of politicking because of the way politics have been portrayed in our history. We take a more superficial view of what politics mean, as though it is all bad and about behaving in deceptive or conniving, self-serving ways.
And in the workplace, we default to thinking that the virtuous approach is simply to bury head and work hard. That can be a great start in a small working team or organisation where visibility isn’t really a problem. It also works well when productivity, key work metrics are not contentious. Then politicking can seem like it’s all about bootlicking, gossiping and acting in the worse, socially destructive ways.
Politics, which is derived from greek words meaning ‘affairs of a city’ is fundamentally relating to governance and interactions between fellow beings living in the same environment, subject to different constraints and influences that are interdependent on one another in the community. The relationship-building, social interactions, tussle for power, influence or mind-share are all part of it. In a workplace, where we are all coming together to achieve something together, it takes effort and the meta-layer of ‘work’ to organise everyone together.
Work today has evolved and become increasingly complex; it is hard to measure individual effort easily, and particularly challenging to identify precisely what the right skillsets are to progress to the next level. It is ultimately the ability to organise others and persuade them to work together that produces value as opposed to working and contributing directly.
There is a role for politics in all of lives, and maybe Singapore needs to build a culture of politcal-awareness and also encourage citizens to appreciate the positive role it can play in society, workplaces. And we may all also learn the right social, emotional intellect needed to handle tricky situations. With the geopolitical climate of the world today, Singapore needs to cultivate more brilliant diplomats than ever before. How else to do so than to help our people recognise the value of such work to the survival and success of a city state nation.
When I started more than 10 years ago in the infrastructure sector focusing on environmental solutions, I saw a lot of new energy startups. A lot of them were facing difficulty on the capital front because all the wealth of the energy sector is tied up in Oil & Gas or the traditional utilities. The startups needed to access regulated infrastructure, regulated markets as well as capital in order to scale but it was difficult. The incumbents were gate-keeping.
So I came to this conclusion that nurturing startups in the energy space wasn’t so much about forming the next unicorn or tech-giant equivalents. It was about strengthening the incumbents; and that these startups are ultimately finding a match in terms of strategic investors in the incumbents in order to exit or to find their innovations adopted through the value chain.
Even for the commercial & industrial, behind-the-meter type solutions, I had in mind that the traditional incumbents would still win out because of their brands and stability.
Turns out that these became areas where they tend to beat a strategic retreat. Because it was too difficult. The big guys had a couple of things they wanted to sell; and they sure could provide some service in order to sell those electrons or molecules. They would even invest in some hardware on your site such as a metering system, or some tanks and nozzles, etc.
But once things got complex, where they have to manage some operations (even virtual ones), and liability at the customers’ sites, it became too difficult. They also think it’s too small, so they left it to whom they believe would be the small guys.
Now it took a long time but these were still difficult projects for the small guys! The EPC players, system integrators, tech solution providers had to come together, get into the complexities of energy service contracting and setting up new operation protocol to get projects up. Slowly they came up; sometimes with investments from the cashflow of these contracting firms, sometimes from family offices and rich borrowers. Financial innovation sort of quickly caught up to support this.
The resulting model, as it turns out, is more of a fund structure where capital is raised in a vehicle that will deploy capital into those energy-as-a-service projects. There is basically an increasing specialisation in the capital-heavy versus labour/technical-heavy segments of the industry. The market is still struggling to understand whether these C&I type energy assets (be it a new chiller/cooler, some kind of tech-enabled energy management systems, or just a set of solar panels with battery energy storage system) is considered infrastructure. Nevertheless, they see it as riskier than traditional state-granted concession type of infrastructure, but still safer than privatw equity where the money is put into operating companies without committed long-term revenues.
Now, I want to address the segment of the market that is also dealing in utility scale renewable power. The end of market moves and financial innovations seem to also point towards a fund structure. Whether it is Equis Energy (now Vena) or even Brookfield Infrastructure that started off in more traditional infrastructure, a whole lot of large scale renewable projects are eventually funded and operated by funds.
I would have imagined that funds would be taking over the more traditional parts of the sectors but instead, what we are really seeing is that funds have become the vehicle for transiting into a new energy system of the world. Is this just an interim solution or do we expect funds to become the energy companies of the future?
As I ponder over the paradoxes of our society and nature, I begin to see more and more how our traditional linear paradigms about advancement and growth jars too much against reality.
There are many things that appears contradictory and yet continue to co-exist peacefully in the world without apparent conflict except in our minds. There are tyrants who are charismatic, loved and admired but also incompetent democratically elected leaders who could set a country back by decades. And there are both decentralised and centralised systems that appear to thrive, and also implode.
We ask ourselves if history proceeds through its course regardless of individual’s actions and it is just collective macro force created by the tiny actions of every individual that matters, or that it progresses through the agency of a few, put in the positions of power and influence? It’s not clear at all.
So when we think that progress in the system involves maturity of technology, of having regulation, standardisation, proper rules of engagement in place, we also recognise that these things stifles innovation and block new, emergent contenders from taking over incumbent structures.
Similarly, having contending standards or technology pathways look as though they are going to create a gridlock that prevents the industry from adopting a single unified approach.
The western, perhaps Anglo-Saxon, thought models make it difficult to hold those juxtaposing, contradictory ideas together because it supposes that there is just this one way that is the right way.
Whether it’s climate tech or climate or sustainability startups, I’ve been encountering them recently. Of course, they are just startup companies, looking to find a product-market fit and then scale their business. There is a massive distraction in today’s market where you could grow a business out of making grant applications and putting together plans, where you try to get funding to take off.
This sounds a lot more like research in academia than the economics of a free market. While government is hoping to drive the development of good climate solutions, they are still tapping on the market where it failed, doing so through what they believe are ways to keep things market-driven when they have actually replaced the market and allowed the grant application processes to pick winners.
The challenge is that the winners picked through a grant application process are not going to be the type who wins in the market. These are firms who would have scrutinized the fine print, delivered on arbitrary KPIs and proxies that some bureaucrat came up with in his or her office. And these schemes are just distracting time, money and resources away from the startups towards satisfying governance requirements. After all, ‘it is taxpayers’ money”
The work of growing a new industrial ecosystem isn’t easy and I’ve spent considerable part of my career thinking about ecosystems, value chains, bottlenecks in developing an industry. If the government can give some demand assurance perhaps for a specific project, or product that the customer would be able to use or satisfied with, then it could help. And very often, if politicians want to be able to make claims about having supported one particular development then things becomes more difficult, not easy. When economic support is driven by a desire for narratives rather than allowing the stories to emerge from a system that is created, you can get a poorly specified policy.
I wrote about experience curve pricing and how China executed it as their industrial policy and successfully developed dominance in several sectors. It is hard work, and it takes a lot out of the economy, but it pays off subsequently.
The problem with Singapore is that we keep hitting up our scale limits. When we successfully bet on the right industries that have incredible growing demand, we end up expanding to our space and resource limits that we have to cede our dominance to others.
One good example was the manufacturing of actuators for hard disks. Singapore once had almost 70% market share for the production of that. Imagine that the majority of hard disks used in the world’s PCs had actuators that were manufactured in Singapore. But as the demand expanded significantly, companies like Toshiba, Seagate-Maxtor which had plants in Singapore faced a problem – they didn’t have enough space to add additional lines in their manufacturing facilities in Singapore. Of course, cost of manpower was also rising – and so they started to set their sights on other ASEAN markets for these manufacturing activities.
Singapore just had to keep going up the value chain; and it gets harder and harder to be able to bet on the right products that had good growth or stable demand externally. Most of the time, these demand were captured by the international companies first, and then when they set up their supply base in Singapore, they are effectively bringing that demand to Singapore. That was how we expanded our economy and ‘created’ markets for our economy.
There were still Singapore businesses which were successful in finding opportunities overseas and managed to capture demand externally. But how many of them were actually creating manufacturing in Singapore? How many of them actually brought most of their supply chain through our economy? It was probably quite limited because Singapore was either too expensive or simply not efficient to run them through Singapore. Besides, Singapore doesn’t even have much integrated full-scale supply chains within the country – we are merely one of the stops or churning out one particular part, or assembling some of the components for something much bigger eventually.
So, the experience curve strategy may not work well in Singapore. Yet what then could have that same sort of sticky effect that Singapore’s development can run on? What can generate persistent advantages that are self-reinforcing, without relying on a massive scale, and that do not hit up against our scale limits? We used to sell our ability to integrate and coordinate, but in my opinion, we will run up against it due to increasing size and increasingly siloed areas of specialisation. Besides, that advantage is limited to the government departments.
I think we are lacking focus when it comes to finding a particular niche that we can get into, which initially does not have sufficient scale but could be stewarded into success. It could be focusing on being excellent in a small area which has some natural scale limits in the global markets yet able to fit under the natural limits in Singapore. It could be in making something technically sophisticated that forms a small component of something that many other parts of the world will use for producing everything else. And then organising ourselves to make sure we truly dominate in that space – through strong lobbying and advocacy efforts in other countries and marketing ourselves strongly towards whoever is the end or intermediate users who have the ability to influence and bring that end-demand to Singapore.
We only need a basket of those areas of excellence and strong value proposition to fill our economy and survive. But I may be wrong about it.
So it started when I was reading Cedric Chin’s writing about Morris Chang, and then about Texas Instruments dominating semicon industry through the invention of the Learning Curve pricing. Here is a situation where a large company basically finances its product into dominance by sacrificing some early profits as they expect lower prices to generate sufficient demand to increase utilisation of their machine, improving product yield through improvements in the manufacturing process.
This enabled Texas Instruments to dominate the industry as the anticipated increase in manufacturing yield (as a result of the ‘learning curve’), enabled more aggressive pricing, pushing out competitors, increasing market share for Texas Instruments, and thereby creating more scale advantages to drive more yield improvements. This is a remarkable use of financing to use scale economies to dominate the market. Essentially, most of the digital tech companies tries to use this as a means to eventually dominate a market of their niche.
The original idea of the learning curve of course came with manufacturing, and I believe this idea was applied at the scale of the entire industry in China when it comes to solar panels, Li-on battery architecture and now probably electric vehicles. By massively subsidising the products and creating demand not just domestically but also in foreign markets, China successfully increased utilisation of their capital equipment, improved their manufacturing capabilities and cement their advantage further.
While other markets are still focused on ‘costs’ of deploying solar, or using batteries, China took a different perspective, one that was driven by manufacturing capabilities and learning curve. I believe Japan had desired such an approach as well, having been subsidising certain markets and technologies, including development of hydrogen cars as well as residential hydrogen appliances (see ENE-FARM home use fuel cell system).
Sometimes when we wonder if we are too early into the market for something, when it comes to the government that is willing to orchestrate a strategy at that sort of industrial level, one can mobilise the resources to create the future rather than wait for the right time.
I’ve been fighting against the prevailing culture for the past decade of my career. And for those who blame things on culture and act like it cannot be changed, they are being delusional. I have a few examples to show:
How did we get from flagging for a cab on the street to punching our mobile phone screens to hail a cab?
How did we get from ‘solar power’ is too inefficient and there is not enough space in Singapore to targeting a 2GWp solar by 2030?
How did we get from being in kampongs where we helped each other and lived for generations in a house to thinking that our financial lives depend on getting BTO, then selling it after MOP and then upgrading non-stop over our adulthood?
While it takes time, culture can be changed. It also takes identifying some loose bricks in the existing edifice to overhaul the structure of our prevailing culture. Energy transition is one tough one to crack, but that said, our region in Southeast Asia has already moved quite a bit from the days of coal-fired power generation. Yes there was a bit of attempts to catch on with the hype around hydrogen but the dollars and sense prevailed at least for now.
So I’ve been toying with the idea of doing a lot more content to teach all of us about energy transition and to be able to learn together. There is a whole lot of de-stigmatising, trying things out, and unlearning our previous biases to be able to move the culture a bit and accelerate the transition. There’s a question of format, level of engagement, how to manage and nurture a community and so on. I guess I’ll have to dive in head first.
Popularised by Warren Buffett, the idea of business moats is simply some kind of persistence or stickiness in demand that businesses have, which can keep them going. Basically it is really anything that helps to reduce competition to a business. This is important in the real world though we tend to celebrate competition in economics. Business moats are actually necessary for innovation, and avoiding a race to the bottom.
Moats are largely about maintenance of a profit margin. The stronger the moat, the higher the margin would be but having a moat itself makes a lot of difference. In fact, we tend to worry in economics about moats because we think it creates high margins. That’s not always true. You could have low margins as a moat itself – because being able to keep your costs low would keep competitors at bay. The point of moats is more about the persistence of the margin.
The most significant problem with competition is that you are in a dynamic environment that keeps you on your toes. Now you may think that is a good thing. But if we keep having to compete with competitors who are just diverting your customers easily through one-off gimmicks and popping up in different places, dislodging your margins here and there, it is not going to make a significant dent in your profits, but it certainly takes up your attention and ability to consider longer-term growth and innovation.
It is such long-term thinking that a business moat creates, which can support the maturing of a system. Yes, other institutional factors contribute to the growth and development of markets. But pure ‘perfect competition’ in the manner it is traditionally thought isn’t one of them. Many developed countries and markets have that sort of dynamism and competition. Just go to a weekday market in a mid-sized town in Africa. But that in itself does not produce the sort of progress that capitalism is touted to produce.
What underlies the success of market capitalism is ultimately the ability not just to accumulate capital but to be freed of that savage competition to engage in more medium to long-term strategic competition. And that is enabled by business moats.
Some interesting announcements and updates were coming out of Ecosperity last week. Most of them oriented around financing of the transition. This is an important topic considering that a lot of our existing economic system is locked into high carbon intensity systems because of financial incentives. Being able to change the incentives can help adoption of more emission-reduction measures.
Transition credits
Launched in 2023, a coalition of players were studying the use and deployment of transition credits. Verra also started working on a proper methodology to account for the carbon emission reductions from transition; and they launched it last week. Since the initial MAS announcement, the Acen Coal-fired power plant in the Philippines have become a candidate for a project that will issue transition credits in exchange for shortening the project’s tenure. And Mitsubishi also announced joining the team of firms taking a stake in the consortium that will generate the transition credits. The idea is that the consortium could then sell off the transition credits to players in Singapore who can then offset the carbon taxes; and there is hope to do the same for Japan.
I believe there is interest for these players to also participate in developing more renewable energy projects in the Philippines to help make up for the shortfall of power generation. After all, the article linked above quoted Rockerfeller Foundation that the shortfall will require “1,000MW of solar, 250MW of wind, and 1,000MW of battery energy storage”. Not sure if it comes as a surprise to all, but because of resource availability, solar and wind farms are not ‘always-on’. They only generate a fraction of their nameplate capacities most of the time, which means a lot more capacities must be built to produce the same amount of gross energy. Energy storage is needed to help time-shift the energy to when required.
WEF-GenZero aviation initiative
Launched as ‘Green Fuel Forward’ – it is a capacity-building initiative that is aimed at drawing in airlines, refiners, logistics companies, banks and others. I think the idea of building up capacity to deal with the entire SAF ecosystem is useful. Aviation decarbonisation over the next few decades disproportionately depends on SAF. It is good that the global aviation industry have more or less settled on this particular decarbonisation pathway and is developing various tools to be able to adopt it.
More than just using a different fuel, it involves getting customers to share in the higher cost of the fuel. How to do so is the issue; and all the airlines are afraid of the ticket pricing affecting their competitive position. Different approaches to distributing the emission reduction costs have been mooted: (1) some like the idea of a corporate decarbonisation programme where partners are gathered together and somehow agree to some formula to share the cost of the low-carbon fuel premium; (2) others think we could convert the emission reductions into some kind of credits to be sold to freighters or passengers who are on board those flights. Those methods involve using airlines as the market-maker for emissions reduction.
The customers of airlines especially the corporate players will need to determine their strategy when it comes to flight carbon emission abatement, as well as the budget they can allot to it. For now, corporate probably have some kind of trip budget – they might have to scale it down based on the SAF prices they are expecting. The airlines themselves will have to develop their own strategy of allocating the cost of SAF to passengers or corporate customers. And of course they can then issue or bundle the SAF-credits (SAF-C) accordingly.
As stated in the ST article on this initiative, each SAF-C means a reduction of 2.5-2.8 tonnes of carbon emissions. Assuming that each SAF-C is priced exactly equals to the premium that airlines pay for SAF above their conventional jet fuel, you’re looking at about US$1000-1,600 for each SAF-C. Now in comparison, a typical carbon credit (representing 1 tonne of carbon dioxide abatement) out in the market is selling at around US$3-4; or if it’s CORSIA-eligible, maybe US$20? So corporates are going to have quite some difficulty working out what is worth paying for SAF-C if you were supposing there was going to be some kind of market and price-discovery for those credits. Does it mean the airlines will have to pass on the rest of the cost shortfall to other customers? Then why do only the SAF-C buyers get to claim the reductions?
A lot of capacity-building will be needed and a proper vision for the workings of the ecosystem worked out.
Singapore government’s clean energy fund
There was yet another announcement about US$500m fund that Singapore government is going to deploy for green projects in the region, as part of the new ‘office’ that MAS is going to set up (named FAST-P). That’s actually going to be really interesting though the news was very scarce on details. I suppose they just wanted to announce some parameters they have decided during Ecosperity week while many other things are still being worked on.
We know there will be 3 pillars: (1) accelerating the energy transition away from fossil fuels to clean energy, (2) ramping up green investments, and (3) decarbonising emissions-intensive sectors like cement and steel production. I suppose the first pillar might relate to the transition credits mentioned earlier. The FAST-P office will probably be spending more efforts for (2) because that will be a lot more complex and require someone to drive or coordinate across different parties. It is not clear how (3) can be done when those sectors are likely the beneficiaries themselves either through energy efficiency investments or fuel/electricity substitution.
Having been involved in the set-up of Infrastructure Asia some 7 years ago, I am fully aware of how much effort behind the scenes just to get the resources together, not to mention the actual work of setting up the office. The work to be done by the office is really to identify the activities where it is worthwhile helping to reduce the riskiness of other financiers or funder. The metric would probably be more impact driven though for the sake of Singapore’s economy, it would be necessary to require anchoring some activities out of Singapore.
I think it’s really great to see how the various entities within the Singapore government or related organs (and I’m almost definitely stretching that by implying platforms like Genzero, which is part of Temasek, and some of those Singapore firms dealing in transition credits) are trying to tackle the issue of the transition, not just for Singapore but for the region.
Going beyond the energy system, there’s another important element to consider for Singapore as we are faced with a world in transition for the energy system. Singapore successfully built itself out to be a sort of energy hub even without domestic energy resources itself. In 2023, Singapore imported 145 Mtoe (million tonnes of oil equivalent) and exported 76 Mtoe. We basically re-exported more than what we consumed as a country for the entire year; and this is because we are largely importing petroleum products to be refined and then exported as more differentiated products. As an economy, Singapore earns the ‘cracking spreads’ from the refinery and drive the economy with that. Technically, it is the oil & gas companies running the refineries that earn that spread.
But more things happen after that, too. Because the refineries are left with a lot of heavy oils at the bottom of the barrel, we have lots of maritime fuels to spare, which coincides nicely with our large transhipment port facilities, together with our highly efficient port system that ensures a strong throughput. These advantages combine to allow Singapore to be the largest bunkering hub in the world. Bunkering refers to the refuelling of maritime fuel for the vessels calling at the port of Singapore. Storage terminals and other facilities will contribute to that.
With that scale, comes along a lot of other opportunities and economic activities that helps drive the economy. Vessels will call at the port to move the cargoes, which means that vessel services are required at the port. All sorts of cargo audit, verification services would be required. Engineering for vessel repair and overhaul could be added to the port city.
If we go back up stream to the refinery process, there are a lot of corresponding supply chain, derivative products that can all be based in Singapore, including some of the petrochemical production, wastewater treatment, waste oil recovery, centralised utilities services for the chemical plants. And it is not limited to manufacturing of course. There would have to be engineering firms, system integration firms, companies stocking up components for all of these plants including valves, flanges, and so on.
So while we can go on and on about the energy transition, when politicians and government think about their economies, there has to be some kind of rational and gradual shift rather than sudden evaporation of all of these activities. I don’t think we have clear solutions yet. For the past decade or so, government had left corporates to plan their own transitions, hoping to create friendly policies which will ‘help’ these corporates along their transition plan.
Now the issue is that the corporates tend to make big ambitious commitments when times are good only to realise they cannot be delivered as the resources they have is insufficient. Better yet, many of them set targets based on assumptions that simply does not hold in a low-carbon economy. So there is mostly empty talk, with no sticks or carrots to keep them in line. This is not just about discipline of executives and managers, but the ability of shareholders and other stakeholders to bear the costs of the changes necessary.
And then in 2020, Covid-19 struck and the government went full steam ahead with interventions, ushering an exceptional era where more expectations are piled on them to intervene directly and set regulations to push the world towards net zero. We all had hoped so through rounds and rounds of COP; but they really only started waking up a bit more during Covid-19. Yet the pandemic left us all weaker, with less resources to cope with the sustainability issues. When the funding and stimulus from the pandemic dries up, it seemed that a lot of plans for net zero had to take more of a backseat.
In Singapore we tried to ramp things up a bit more with the carbon taxes – despite how relaxed it actually is, there were still groans and moans – serious enough for the government to consider some kind of ‘rebates’. It seems to me that pricing carbon wasn’t really enough – just as setting up more tariffs was not going to cause manufacturing to magically re-shore back to America. There’s still a lot of coordination, capacity-building to do.
So let’s work together, and let’s devote some resources to consultants like my kind to help build that capacity and create that capability to moe into the next phase.
