Singapore energy transition

As a strategy consultant devoted to the energy and climate transition, I spend a lot of time thinking about what is the pathway to transit our economy, and economic activities. A lot of the confusion and disorderliness arises out of poor understanding, misinformation and also uncertainties surrounding technology curves. Another reason is that we desperately want to get things right before we can make the move – this is a disease resulting from having too much information and failing to be strategic. Sometimes that is too late.

We have pretty much breached the threshold of 1.5 degree Celsius warming. That means we will have to decarbonise our economy while simultaneously deal with the consequences of climate changes within those temperature thresholds. We could fall into various positive feedback cycles that bodes ill for our climate systems. For example, we could be looking to manage the increased temperatures we experience by introducing more cooling, creating more comfortable indoor spaces that ends up throwing up more heat into the external environment, and also emitting more carbon dioxide in the process. I suspect it is already happening in Singapore.

I think an orderly and balanced transition isn’t about looking for the ultimate fuel or energy vector as our panacea. Even for Singapore, I dare say despite the National Hydrogen Strategy, it is very unlikely that we will be able to replicate our 95% natural gas strategy for our electricity system with something low-carbon. Unless it is biomethane but even then, there are doubts about the adequacy of supply. This means we will need to adopt different strategies.

I think for an energy system like Singapore, electrification may not always be a solution because adding more demand for green electricity to the grid would just make it harder to green our grid unless we manage to pull off an ASEAN power grid system where we can bring green power from anywhere in ASEAN and consume it in Singapore. Otherwise, if we assume a standalone grid system in Singapore that have projects offshore with dedicated connections to Singapore grid, it is better to focus on greening the existing electricity demand first, before looking at stepping up on electrification efforts (especially those where natural gas is currently being consumed).

The last thing we want to do is to electrify all our road transportation, only to have to import green hydrogen to be used to generate electricity to charge our electric vehicles. If that actually happens, then won’t it make more sense to put the green hydrogen directly into hydrogen-fueled vehicles instead? We want to minimise these inefficiencies and unnecessary round-trips. I think we need to consider first the anticipated electricity demand and the size of the system we will need over the next 2-3 decades, and make sure we are able to strike enough deals and do enough projects to meet that first.

Then separately, on the fuel systems side, the authorities will benefit from developing a clearer view of what our industries need. The industries are also transforming and trying to meet decarbonisation obligations, not just from the carbon tax introduced in Singapore but also pressure from other markets. By aggregating these needs and then looking at common infrastructure or aggregated deals that we can explore, we create more synergies and stickiness for the industries housed in Singapore. Whether it is renewable diesel, sustainable aviation fuel or biofuels for the maritime industry, these various fuels can be looked into more holistically for the demand pockets within Singapore to tackle them together.

We need to use the same attitude we have used for industry promotion and attraction to look at our energy system. Perhaps for the next leg of growth, the Energy Markets Authority will need to be parked under the Economic Development Board? Or at least they will have to be more coordinated and act almost as one agency in charting the needs and course ahead.

Primary energy fallacy

I think more people need to understand this concept that was attributed to Michael Liebriech, a thought-leader in the energy transition. Sam Hamels just wrote a pretty short explainer of its implications on Linkedin, which I encourage you all to read.

The assumptions are simple and does not address some of the other obstacles along the way but it is important that we should not be overwhelmed by the gross energy requirements in primary energy terms when we recognise that a lot of primary energy in the form of fuel are lost in the process of converting them into energy.

There are other obstacles along the way however, when considering that the most viable and economic renewable electricity sources are typically wind and solar, with substantial hydropower in the mix for certain geographies. These include:

  • Transmission and distribution infrastructure:
    • Hydropower tends to be farther away from demand centers so the distance of transmission makes the infrastructure expensive
    • Wind and solar tends to be intermittent which means that a lot more needs to be transmitted during the times they are produced while the infrastructure remains underutilized when they are not available
    • Overall capacity will need to be increased compared to the fossil energy regime
  • Energy storage infrastructure:
    • While hydropower dams could benefit from becoming pumped storage, other renewables such as wind and solar will require significant energy storage in the grid in order to reduce the need to overbuild (because of the point above)
    • Energy storage will also help provide the ancillary services for the electricity system as fossil plants retreat from the system (eg. reserve markets, frequency and voltage supports) while it becomes more volatile due to intermittent renewable electricity.
    • A lot more investment into stationary energy storage will be required. At least before the more lofty vehicle-to-grid concepts kick into place.
  • End-use system/equipment changes
    • To reap the benefits of the improved efficiency of an electricity based energy system, there will be a need to electrify more which means end-use equipment will need to be changed – assuming we’re trying to change a whole fleet of equipment with no regard to remaining lifespan, we are not properly using up our invested assets.
    • Typically, fuel-driven systems have longer lifespans than those driven by electricity – that may have to do with the fact that fuel-driven systems are more mechanical and have less delicate circuitry systems. Of course, that varies with specific use-case and appliance but what this means is that you might still face more frequent replacement, and the environmental cost of that might need to be carefully considered.
    • In some cases, the change in end-use equipment requires further infrastructure support. The most important example is electric vehicles, which need the support of a robust charging network – that must be supported by improved distribution networks in the grid.
    • Besides the grid, institutional improvements that properly allocate costs and reflect them to customers are necessary as well. Sometimes, it may make the transition harder as well. For example, the peak demand pricing of electricity markets drove a bakery in Queensland Australia to change their electric ovens to gas fired ones because they absolutely have to bake their breads in the early hours of the morning.

Now the reason I’m listing all these other obstacles is to challenge us to think through the solutions needed having convinced ourselves that we actually can work on getting enough supply into the system. There is still a lot of work to do to ensure this supply actually matches the real demand. Looking at gross energy terms is simply not enough, as evident from the primary energy fallacy itself.

SAF sustainability and pricing

This year, the EU mandated 2% Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) blending in all airports feeding into aeroplanes. The definitions of SAF for EU is clear, mostly based on a whitelist of feedstocks that are proven to be ‘sustainable’ and achieves a high level of carbon emissions reduction on a lifecycle basis (70% or more compared to A1 Jet Fuels). Unlike CORSIA, which puts the onus on airlines to reduce their emissions from jet fuels, RefuelEU regulations put the responsibility on fuel suppliers that supply to the airports. These suppliers will need to quote their prices to airlines accounting for these regulations, and while airlines don’t have to deal with the hassle of making sure the blend is correct to meet compliance requirements, they will need to bear the increased costs.

Now, there are also similar SAF regulations in the US under Renewable Fuel Standards, but their requirements for feedstocks and lifecycle carbon emissions reductions are different. Just to caveat first that I’m way less familiar with the US standards and requirement but based off some work from my colleagues, I understand they are less stringent, defining SAF to require 50% reduction in lifecycle carbon emissions compared to conventional jet fuels. This allows feedstocks such as corn ethanol, or other dedicated energy crop-based feedstocks (including canola, other oilseed crops) to be used for their SAF.

And if you refer back to the ICAO standards set under CORSIA, they only require that there’s 10% reduction in carbon emissions. It is still unclear to me what would constitute ‘SAF’ to the countries in Asia Pacific that are all introducing some SAF volumetric blending mandate.

One of the key challenges with just defining a standard threshold for carbon reduction and then setting a volumetric SAF target is that you don’t incentivise SAF producers to reduce their lifecycle carbon emissions. It becomes a race to the bottom for the airlines or fuel suppliers to buy the cheapest SAF that meets the threshold for compliance. If instead, we set a carbon emission reduction target and require the blend to achieve that target, then we can benefit from a greater diversity of SAF feedstocks and pathways that meets the economics on the basis of a unit carbon abatement cost. After all, the carbon emission reduction is the piece of value we care about for SAF at the moment, won’t it be better to price that?

SAF Pathways and value pockets

Today’s conventional wisdom around the Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) market is that it will start with the HEFA pathway which converts oily waste compounds into jet fuel. The process is well established and economical. The challenge is aggregation of the feedstocks which takes the form either of used cooking oil and oily waste streams coming out of some vegetable oil production streams. They could also take virgin vegetable oil and oil from oilseeds to produce (but these tend to have a higher lifecycle emission associated with them as they are cultivated and will require fertiliser inputs and other resources).

The regulators and market expect that these feedstocks will be insufficient as the virgin oils should be reserved for food use and the waste-based feedstocks are limited. So then when the HEFA feedstocks supply goes down, prices of these feedstocks would move up towards the next SAF pathway. The popular contender after HEFA is the alcohol-to-jet (ATJ) pathway. They take bioethanol or methanol and turn them into jet fuel. This process is a bit more expensive, but because bioethanol is already being produced by various plants worldwide to supply provide for gasoline blending in countries with ethanol-blending mandate, it has a much more stable and ready market than used cooking oil.

Further technology pathways are expected to involve gasification where biomass is subjected to thermal processes that breaks down the material into constituent carbon, oxygen, hydrogen and nitrogen compounds, then reformed to make liquid fuels including jet fuel. These pathways are even more expensive, but their feedstock, which is pretty much any biomass, would be much more abundant.

So, the supply curve is expected to notch upward in discrete steps; once prices hit the threshold to unlock the next technology pathway, more feedstock will enter the picture and hence increase the supply of SAF available. This doesn’t mean that the earlier pathways will earn more margin, because the bottlenecks are the feedstocks; typically, the feedstock owners or aggregators tend to extract more of that value.

But this would mean that the prices of SAF should and can only rise as the mandate for more SAF and aviation decarbonisation becomes stricter and emission reduction targets become more ambitious. Now there is another transition to consider. That is a scenario where the chief driver of SAF adoption, regulations and blending would be decided by the market – but the outcome they are targeting would be based on proportion reduction of carbon emissions relative to conventional jet fuels.

Now of course, some from Oil & Gas players might think they can use carbon capture and storage to lower the fossil jet fuel intensity to meet the criteria. Yes to a certain limit; because the carbon dioxide emitted during the aircrafts’ journeys from fossil jet fuels will always been counted while the biofuel or synthetic fuel’s emissions will be zero (because they are short-cycle or biogenic carbon dioxide).

So I urge regulators and policy-makers; focus on the carbon intensity reduction targets, rather than volumetric blending targets.

Asset prices & markets

I haven’t looked closely into the numbers, but one cannot help but realise that those markets that have grown well over the past few decades, but where stock exchanges or equity multiples have been relatively pathetic in performance, tend to have exceptional performance in the real estate market. Cases that come to mind include Singapore, China, Vietnam and perhaps more recently, Hong Kong.

This makes the proposal from Singapore government on trying to boost the stock exchange in Singapore through this ‘Equity Market Development Programme (EQDP)’ pretty interesting. The initial idea is to have funds that inject liquidity into companies in the SGX beyond just those represented in the broad market index. Mechanics aside, I don’t know how well the intentions are conveyed by the government. Maybe they think it is too sensitive to share or too controversial. I think it’s more interesting to consider the intent properly than the mechanics or the chances of success at this point.

The issue with wealth getting tied up with the real estate market in Singapore and especially for Singaporeans is that it is illiquid as an asset; the value growth can be quite uneven, and more significantly, housing is a necessity so when it becomes a way in which majority of the people store their wealth, it prevents the newcomers from entering the market. Across generations, it can lead to severe distortions in terms of affordability. Home ownership is seen as a cornerstone in the formation of community and Singapore society – owning a home gives us a physical stake, and more importantly, it leads us to take actions that are more long-term when it comes to caring for our surroundings.

So in my mind, the EQDP is more about trying to activate and encourage overall movement of wealth towards the stock market rather than the housing market. After all, not everyone needs to hold a piece of stock but everyone needs a shelter above their heads. We’d rather have asset price inflation in the stock market than to have it in our housing market. Besides, the liquidity of Singaporeans has probably been contributing to the asset price inflation in the stock markets in the US. So why not keep them at home? This, I think is probably a more significant intent for EQDP than just thinking about financial markets development. And I think this social intent is probably more admirable than the calculative sense of how much more economic benefit or mileage we can get out of the markets in Singapore or the spill over financial services impact it can create.

Now whether the mechanisms proposed as part of the EQDP makes sense or not, I’ll perhaps comment some other day. And maybe when it is clearer what it would be.

Land resources

I don’t think we’re being imaginative or aggressive enough with tackling climate issues. Nor are we thinking about how to sync-up our efforts to grow our economies, improve lives together with environmental conservation efforts. There are plenty of false dichotomies that result from how we’ve developed our economies. It’s haunting us and discouraging us from thinking in worthy directions for problem-solving.

One example of a dichotomy that may turn out to be false in the long run is the issue of food versus fuel. The food shortage problems today is driven by logistics and localised disaster more than aggregate unavailability or insufficiency. If anything, instead of trying to outright ban dedicated energy crops or crop-based feedstocks for biofuel production, it would be wiser to encourage a programme of reducing desertification and farming of marginal land with resilient crops that can be used as feedstocks for biofuels.

Another involves questioning of thermodynamically-unappealing solutions. Direct air capture (DAC) requires that energy is so cheap that you should mechanically capture the carbon dioxide from the air with machines. And yes, it doesn’t take as much land per unit of carbon captured. It could even compete with vegetation/forests. One could consider through the lens of this competition with nature: Forests takes about 860 square km of land to absorb 1 million tonnes of carbon dioxide whereas if you were to build a DAC plant plus a solar farm powering it which can capture 1 million tonnes of carbon dioxide a year would only take about 30 square km, which is ~3.4% of the land area. [my calculations are back-of-envelope and derived from unit figures here and here].

Yes, but then what about the limited lifespan and all the value chain emissions from making solar panels and DAC systems? Indeed, those trade-offs are worth thinking about, which is why we probably won’t advocate replacing natural habitats and forests with DAC. A forest is more than just sequestering carbon, but also provides other ecosystem services such as enhancing biodiversity, increasing groundwater supply, and even helping to clean the water and reducing the risks of desertification.

At some level, biofuels compete with synthetic or e-fuels; and biomethane perhaps is imagined to compete with hydrogen. But all of these are false dichotomies. The world needs us to keep working on different solutions and coordinate our efforts to scale them where they make sense. One can be purist about different things and get nowhere. Let’s try to lay out the trade-offs and work through those in specific contexts rather than seek to rule out solutions on the whole.

What made Singapore’s economy?

One of the reasons I determined to study economics was because Singapore was a country labeled as an economic miracle, and I thought it’d be cool to figure out what was behind it. For decades, we’ve been told that it was the brilliance, hard work and sacrifice of our forefathers, strong leaders and a little bit of circumstances that made us what we are today.

It was a nice feel-good lesson but it wasn’t always easy to make clear of what it means for the future. There was limited strategies that we could adopt out of it. We did also learn that Singapore was a trading hub so it was vital that the world trading system went on and developed, because we facilitate that trade across west and the east, and we served those large vessels, and loads of containers, bulk goods that had to change hands in our location. So the port we had serviced these people and lots of local companies and industries grew to support that.

Even that wasn’t enough; it was thanks to the brilliance of our early leaders which attracted industrial players to set up shop in Singapore, provide employment, opportunities for skills, and provide an industrial core on which we could develop from. To accomplish all that, we need to have good and well-educated labour force, and a very stable environment. The strength of our government is delivering on all of that.

Today, our economy remains extremely reliant on trade, though one may argue that our original intent was to use trade to lift ourselves up enough to develop our own industrial giants and core. A couple of countries like Taiwan, Korea, Japan and even China sort of achieved that but Singapore remains much stronger in terms of the bringing in foreign direct investments, and providing services to parts of the economy that’s doing very well. We have yet to really build up strong giants, opt-ing instead to play the financial game which is heavily reliant on money as an asset.

I think it is clear that we had spotted an opportunity to bring ourselves out of poverty through the economic strategies but after it delivered good results previously. From now, we will need to figure out the way forward that does not merely involve repeating past actions, but improving upon those past actions more radically. Finally, we ought to recognise that our final goal is to create our own industrial champions that can secure a footing in the global stage.

60 years on, we have matured a lot as an economy but I think it’s only the beginning.

War against biofuels

As I continued my work promoting the circularity of recovering organic waste and residue for energy purposes (mostly through the production of various biofuels), I begin to see the challenge that this space face.

Right now, EU is putting strict rules around the feedstocks allowed for the biofuels that count towards decarbonisation in their jurisdictions and hence the emergence of ISCC EU standards and certification for the value chains surrounding biofuels (and of course, other renewable fuels). Some crop-based feedstocks are allowed, but most crop-based feedstocks are being penalised by the indirect land-use change (ILUC) considerations – which are being reconsidered at the moment. However, there are some groups who are outright against crop-based feedstocks and considering them unsustainable.

Transport & Environment, in particular, have been rather against the whole idea of biofuels and champion a future that is based on hydrogen. They view biofuels as transition fuels that have no place in a net zero world. Consider the letter crafted to push shipping companies away from biofuels for green shipping just because they claim particular crops have been devastating the environment. They continue their assault on palm and soy industries instead of working alongside to find solutions to help these industries boost yield and reduce deforestation. Consider the achievement of the corn industry in the US, driven by the need to produce bioethanol. Won’t it be better if people work together to realise such improvement and increase the supply of alternative fuels in the world rather than screaming doom and gloom about one feedstock or another?

So what kind of doom and gloom are they perpetuating here, you ask? They commissioned a study by Cerulogy showing that “palm and soy oil would likely make up nearly two-thirds of the biodiesel used to power the shipping industry in 2030 as they represent the cheapest fuels to comply.” Again, the concern is food supply being affected as the resources are directed to energy; and also deforestation driven by these crops as feedstock? Isn’t EU Deforestation Regulations (EUDR) meant to look into these areas? Why not just use the tracking and scrutiny to prevent that damage instead of creating blanket bans? Use an lifecycle assessment-driven approach? And focus our efforts on developing clearer standards for lifecycle assessments rather than trying to exclude solutions before they hit the ground?

Well, if you really want to promote hydrogen, you can also consider the environmental damage from the lack of circularity in the solar, wind and battery materials space. The thing about green hydrogen is that it will require intermittent renewable power and these resources do also take up land space. They may not compete with food crops because they use marginal land; or that livestock can continue to coexist amidst solar panels. Wait, food crops could be grown with other parts of their biomass directed to fuels too! And many of these crops can be directed towards animal feed for feedstocks.

I agree that we probably want to think through a bit how the incentives we create can have very bad unintended consequences. But trying so hard to do that on biofuels is not going to undo the problems introduced by decades of subsidising the fossil industries via various policies. Those distorted incentives are plaguing us till this day.

Why is there such a war against biofuels? I don’t get it.

Capital’s bargaining power

Recently a friend and I was working on some business ideas. We were thinking through scenarios where smart people come up with great business ideas or business models that can generate impressive returns but require capital to do. If the capital markets work perfectly for the specific risk profile of the business (assume that it can be assessed correctly), then all capital should only be able to demand the market rate of return on capital.

We ran some simulations on this. To simplify the whole business and risk, we assume it is a very low-risk infrastructure project that returns constant cashflow across 10 years, one year after the initial cash injection. A project that can bring in >27%, when raising all of its funds from a capital owner, should be split 60-40 if the market hurdle rate is at ~12% for that risk and tenure. This means that though the capital holder is financing 100% of the project, he needs to give up 40% share of the returns to the ones who structured and pulled the project together.

Now, when the project returns rises to 33% over 10 years; and the market hurdle rate remains at 12%, then the capital holder needs to give up 49% share. This means that if the project that the smart guys are able to put together can return more than 33%, then the capital owner needs to give up more than 50% of the returns even though he is contributing 100% of the upfront capital. This is a hard bargain for the ‘entrepreneurs’ organising the resources to strike with capital holders.

This is perhaps how the Thomas Piketty argument about the relative bargaining power of capital gets played out. At the same time, capital can afford to be more patient because the cost of upkeeping capital isn’t as high as trying to upkeep a living person with the wits and capabilities to develop all the ideas and organise the resources. And because capital is more ‘tangible’ and ‘calculative’, it can keep forcing all kinds of cost upon labour side of the equation. In this blog post, labour basically includes the ‘entrepreneurial’ elements as well that is typically somewhat associated with capital.

This is where debt comes in. Instead of getting a co-investor, the project entrepreneur should be able to borrow to finance the project. And the debt tenure can be shorter. A simple solution could be to take out a 4-year debt at 7% interest; this would require the entrepreneur to sacrifice 85% of the project cashflow for the first 4 years, in exchange for the rest of the project’s cashflow. Technically, when structured as a debt, the market interest rate should be lower than the market hurdle rate. Yet because the ‘project’ is new and may not have a sufficient track record, financiers may demand collateral and other risk-management tools to enhance the credit standing. Technically, when structured as a debt, the market interest rate should be lower than the market hurdle rate. Yet because the ‘project’ is new and may not have a sufficient track record, financiers may demand collateral and other risk-management tools to enhance the credit standing. This means that the entrepreneur would have to give out more than he needs to reduce the risks of the capital holder further despite the risk profile of the project.

So, the entrepreneur who does not have any capital to contribute will be seen as having a mouth-watering return since there isn’t any ‘capital at risk’ for the entrepreneur, but the reality is that there is some opportunity cost. Yet if the entrepreneur’s salary is built into the project returns, then he doesn’t have the ‘opportunity cost’. The extra upside would be his ‘supernormal return’.

Fast followers

Being a fast follower is a good strategy; it allows you to take in the lessons from those who have tried and failed first. It is even a strategy that enables you to become a leader from public’s eyes.

But the challenge for the fast follower who gained leadership status is falling into the trap of thinking they are the leader. Their skills in curating what they learnt from the mavericks, scaling what was small and bringing things to market fast, are not going to be suited for what is required to take real leadership: influencing the market, uncovering innovation from their own values and principles.

They may have to pivot at some point when they’ve outcompeted all those whom they were fast-following.