Tag Archives: market

Skills and degrees

There’s been recurring opinions, stories and new reports about jobs and skills in Singapore over the past couple of months. The Job Skills insights report presented some interesting results that can be interpreted in vastly different ways, and is perhaps worth our society deliberating over.

One of the statistic in the report (page 14) that comes across as strange though not surprising, is that a non-degree holder with high skills proficiency is finding it HARDER (lower chance of getting the job) to get high-skilled jobs while a degree holder with medium to low skills proficiency can access high-skilled jobs more EASILY (higher chance of getting the job).

And on the next page, it claims that those same degree holders who were mid-low in skill proficiency had higher remuneration, and more autonomy in the jobs they got. Overall, the slant of the report seems to be promoting the need to obtain degrees and more qualifications even though it is supposed to highlight the importance of skills.

There are different opinions about what exactly is happening in Singapore. Some believe that if there simply aren’t job opportunities around, the paper chase just ends up being an arms race where jobs are just moving around from one group to another. The winner then becomes the certificate issuing organisations and schools.

Others think that there’s something absurd about hiring process and HR if they are so reliant on the degree or paper qualifications rather than real skills. Perhaps the high density market and having no short of manpower options mean that such patterns emerge where paper ‘evidence’ is used more than trying to screen for real skills. That contributes to some kind of ‘efficiency’ in the process especially when the HR function in Singapore isn’t exactly the most progressive.

There are others who believe the government’s emphasis on skills had just become a matter of incentivising more paper mills because it is easier to have a clear-cut measure of the output of their ‘skills’ policy. This is why instead of having skillsfuture churn out people who have the skills for the future (such as AI-literacy, programming skills, ability to think more strategically, understanding of carbon emissions, understanding of new energy technologies or what sustainability is really about), we simply get more aunties who could bake melon pan, or uncles who could generate good morning messages with GenAI.

I exaggerate.

But the point remains that we have a culture that is steeped in wanting to have tangible proofs of something that is genuinely intangible. And degrees or paper qualification remains a proxy for us to somehow observe skills. The point of it all is really the skills rather than the degree – so to make it about the degree seems rather superficial and short term. If anything, the big companies hiring in Singapore could come to the conclusion that since the degree holders they’re hiring have already hit the mid-low level of skills proficiency, the talent pool is really shallow and this is it, and they forgo hiring the non-degree holders who have high skill proficiencies.

Maybe that is when they start pulling out of the market. Because they are not able to access the real talent pool they need.

In long run, our paper chase actually ends up stopping ourselves.

Policy crowding out

Is job creation the responsibility of the government or businesses/entrepreneurs?

Sure, most governments in capitalistic democracies work hard to reduce red tape, improve ease of doing business and provide all kinds of support to businesses. But can policies to create jobs end up crowding out the private sector activities that create jobs, perhaps even undermining the private sector activities?

For example, when EDB in Singapore attracts MNCs that comes into Singapore and starts hiring, providing good and stable jobs, do they end up disincentivising prospective entrepreneurs from starting their own business? Do they also bid up the cost of strong junior hires for the local companies that need them more? Do the companies that comes into the Singapore market compete out local firms who may have been able to perform the same services in the local economy?

Is there a risk that existing investments in the market hold-hostage our domestic policies? Take, for example, the oil & gas industry in Singapore; do its presence slow down our climate policy? Would the fact that government is busy attracting companies and making things smoother for them cause them to compete more effectively with other local companies who may not have that same support from our own government?

Just bringing up the questions worth pondering over. I’ve no answers but I think it’s worth actually looking into actual data and finding ways to understand some of the answers to these questions I’ve raised.

Understanding carbon intensity versus fuel emissions

One of the reasons I’m writing this article is that Asia Pacific is increasingly recognising the role of renewable and alternative fuels, especially biofuels. And one of the ‘measures’ of sustainability of these fuels, which may be low or zero carbon in emissions, is the carbon intensity (Scope 3). However, it often gets confused with the fuel emissions (Scope 1), and so I thought it was worth explaining clearly.

Fuel decarbonisation is so critical that it covers part of decarbonising electricity generation. Relying on a mix of intermittent renewable generation with short-duration storage in the power system is very challenging. Gas peakers are going to be integral in a system that has a significant share of wind and solar power. Yet there are concerns about carbon emissions associated with gas.

Decarbonising natural gas use and other liquid fuel-use remains a critical lever to achieve net zero by 2050. Renewable fuels, especially biofuels, enable a drop-in solution that bridges our immediate decarbonisation needs with future alternative fuel, or complete electric solutions. There are concerns however, with the sustainability of biofuels, and one of the ‘measures’ of sustainability of these fuels, is the carbon intensity of it.

The carbon intensity of the fuel refers to the lifecycle carbon emitted in the production of the fuel, usually expressed in gCO2e/MJ (reads: grammes of carbon dioxide equivalent per mega-joules). For fuel that is zero emissions, or non-reckonable carbon emissions, there are still carbon emissions associated with its production, processing and transportation before its energy is used. And so if it’s being transported from such a location, or that too much logistics were involved in its feedstock collection, those emissions gets accounted for in this carbon intensity metric. EU use thresholds for carbon intensity to determine if the fuel is ‘sustainable’ or not – on the basis that if the fuel does not achieve a level of emissions reduction, then it cannot be considered renewable.

As should be clear by now, carbon intensity is different from the concept of fuel emissions. The carbon intensity value is not reflective of the emissions of the fuel itself but more of its lifecycle, making it a Scope 3 emission as opposed to Scope 1. Take, for example, a regime where there is a carbon tax associated with fuel emissions, the carbon intensity of the fuel would not actually be considered within the calculation of the carbon tax at all – especially if the tax is designed only to apply to Scope 1 (direct emissions).

However, such a regime where a carbon tax is applied to Scope 1, should be mindful that they do not end up incentivising the use of “low-carbon fuel” that have overly high carbon intensities. Because this would defeat the purpose of trying to price the carbon emission as the direct emissions become displaced by emissions in some other parts of the fuel supply chain.

Carbon intensity is also why the International Maritime Organisation have been pushing for the Net Zero Framework that considers the ‘well-to-wake’ emissions (lifecycle emissions) instead of the ‘tank-to-wake’ (direct Scope 1) emissions. If we are focused only on the ‘tank-to-wake’ emissions, then technically, grey hydrogen or grey ammonia would have zero carbon emissions. We don’t want a case where the emissions are not reduced at the system level but just shifted from one part of the value chain to another – that’s why we care about the carbon intensity of a fuel, not just its direct emissions.

It’s probably worth pointing out I first wrote this article on linkedin and you can find it here.

Touting on streets

I’m not sure if it’s just me, but these days, when I’m walking in public spaces, I get really tense and stressed when people approach me to try and get me to do something. Something inside me feels like they are stealing my attention and time without my permission. Yet, at the same time, I do want to be kind and empathise with the person working hard on the street.

EV charging incentives

For a long time, EV charging infrastructure has been seen as something in the domain of public goods and should be driven by the government. The challenge on the government side is the question of whether it makes sense for them to invest ahead of EV adoption. Investors are nervous about it because EV chargers seem to them like something, which can pop up pretty much anywhere, and there’s no ‘moat’ to support stable revenues even if they serve as an infrastructure practically. Without proper government-regulated structure, it is difficult for investors to put capital into infrastructure in a place where there’s going to be limited utilisation.

Contrast this with petrol kiosk franchises – they are well-established and have demonstrable cash flow, with strong support from the oil & gas companies backing them. Electricity companies are sometimes backing EV charging point networks in order to increase electricity retail but the truth is that electricity distribution works on an entirely different business model from fuel distribution. A lot of investors believe that the petrol kiosks will themselves be the best location for very fast or ultra-fast chargers (usually 10-20 minutes for a full charge). The other fast chargers (1.5-4 hours for a full charge) will likely be in destinations like shopping malls or other commercial buildings.

Yet EV charging infrastructure is so important as a basis to increase EV uptake which the energy transition desperately needs. Electrification of energy needs from transport enables an easier decarbonisation as we can focus on renewable energy in the power sector while transport and other sectors just have to focus on electrification (which of course, can be quite a pain for some sectors – that’s for another day). So how do we increase and improve EV charging infrastructure? Where can we align the incentives? What role should the government play, if at all? And what if it becomes an extremely profitable business down the line?

Transition fuels II

Bioenergy, in the form of biogas or liquid biofuels finds themselves in the nexus of many things. And as it turns out, nexus of unrelated fields tends to languish in obscurity for far too long because no one in powerful places is willing to take hold of it and champion it.

And no bioenergy isn’t the kind of thing that is shown in The Matrix. One Uber driver who picked me up on the way to a bioenergy conference in Queensland thought that was what I was referring to.

Typically, bioenergy takes some kind of organic material and makes uses of various processes (synthetic or biological) to convert them into hydrocarbons that are chemically identical to fossil fuels. As it turns out, the way in which the earth cooks up all the historical organic matter into fossil fuels is not the only way in which organic matter can be converted into fuels. There are natural processes that can return these organic matter to precursors, which can allow us to derive the hydrocarbons we could use as fuels. These products are what we call biofuels and collectively, the use of organic matter within the contemporary carbon cycle (or short carbon cycle) to produce energy is known as bioenergy.

As much as these fuel and products are chemically identical to fossil fuels and can utilise all of the oil & gas infrastructure we have built over the past century, their production is so radically different from fossil fuel processes that the oil & gas companies seem to struggle with them. Or at least they find it hard to wean themselves off traditional production and capture new demands using bioenergy. On the other hand, the smaller, emerging players who wants to start bioenergy businesses find themselves shut out of the larger infrastructure base that is used to distribute these fuels because they are firmly locked within the fossil fuel ecosystem. And fossil fuel is just way more competitive if it’s about economics. Regulation does not see a clear path for bioenergy to take hold because they perceive it as a fringe activity, and the fossil lobby could easily quashes those thoughts from emerging. Across the world, bioenergy only took hold because regulation stepped in with blending mandates or direct subsidies to encourage the integration of bioenergy into the existing fossil energy system.

So while there are huge advantages in bringing in bioenergy because it helps prevent those oil & gas infrastructure assets from being stranded, they find themselves in the crosshairs of those parties whom they could help partly because they are in the ‘green camp’. On the other hand, the green camp doesn’t want to adopt and champion the bioenergy cause as much as wind and solar because bioenergy could potentially cement the position of the big oil. In markets where regulations require blending, oil & gas players have gotten involved in the bioenergy value chain, probably reluctantly and not without grumbling. They just try to meet the basic standards while taking all the political credit for having made the change.

There is also another group that bioenergy serves, which ends up becoming their enemies as well. They are the agrifood processing facilities or other food value chain players generating lots of organic waste. In countries where disposal of these organic wastes is well-regulated, anaerobic digestion plants are used for waste treatment. The biogas produced were seen more as a waste gas to be flared than an energy source to be harnessed. To harness these energy, more investments have to be made on the part of these distributed networks of players who might not have the capital readily available. They may not have the decarbonization ambitions either. There are also concerns that once we start harnessing energy from these, there will be more demand for organic waste and even agricultural residues which were traditionally used as substitutes for organic fertilisers. At the end of the day, getting the agrifood value chain involved in bioenergy seemed to be more like a distraction from their core business without contributing significantly to their business. In fact, there is increasing opposition to bioenergy that is driven by the view that it would pit energy against food production, which would be detrimental to a more fundamental need of mankind.

Hence, even though I would argue bioenergy is the most important energy source to support the transition, while playing a significant role in the net-zero world, there’s still so much wanting in this space. There is still no clear space that is adopting and championing this enough to mainstream it.

We will really need to change the narrative on bioenergy. More on this soon.

Structuring incentives for waste

As we try to navigate the climate transition, we are working within a framework of incentives and economic structure where incentives are sometimes mis-aligned to driving climate-positive behaviours. Not just climate but sustainability overall. Waste management represents one of the more problematic area. In many situations, the cost of waste management is pretty much socialised with the cost spread out across a large number of people while the economic benefits accrued by only some. Take electronic waste without proper framework in place for disposal and attribution of responsibility to producers, the society bears the overall cost of managing these difficult waste while the benefits are borne only by the users (especially those who are replacing devices extremely often, and the producers who are selling electronic products.

By incorporating producer responsibility, the cost of disposal and waste management should preferably be priced upfront to customers so that they are paying for the lifecycle cost.

The same should be done for various product packaging. After all, the producers are typically the ones responsible for handling the packaging in the first place so it won’t be too bad for them to take on the responsibility. They can then put the cost into the price tag of the users, who would then be the ones paying for those goods that require the particular packaging. The thing about packaging materials and electronic waste is that they have value as recycled materials anyways – which means that if the ‘disposal’ logistics cost can be at least in part offset through the value recovered from aggregation of these materials, it is a win-win.

What about food waste? Food waste should not be the responsibility of the producers since it is the consumers who determine the level of waste based on how much they purchase and eventually consume. Likewise, those in-between the value chain from farm to table would also be responsible for some of the food waste through their utilisation of the ingredients. The way to make them responsible for the disposal cost is to allow only specific channels of disposing food waste and pricing it properly. The cost of disposing food waste will necessarily be the logistics involved, and then offset against whatever residual value the food waste can generate. What kind of residual value is there? After all, food waste cannot be used to remanufactured food (unlike cardboard whose fibre can be used for recycled paper, or e-waste where the extracted metals can be turned back into materials to produce new products).

Food waste can be turned into energy through anaerobic digestion. And the process will generate methane that can be used as a fuel. The fuel potentially displaces fossil fuel and emits biogenic carbon dioxide in the short carbon cycle. Of course, there are plenty of other biofuels that can also be produced from food waste. If we start putting a value on the food waste, does it mean more of such waste would be produced? It is quite unlikely since the value will probably represent some kind of residual value from the primary use of the food. Yet we find CEO of multi-national company Lufthansa thinking otherwise.

The challenge we have today is that the incentives around recovery of residual value from waste. We will need to redesign how we are able to extract residual value, offset against the disposal costs. We will also need to ensure disposal costs are properly priced and applied to the right parties responsible for the waste generation. We need to set up incentives such that waste is properly sorted and pushed into various streams. The cost of mixed-stream convenience needs to be costed to reflect the cost of sorting.

There’s a lot of work ahead. We need people to get on to them.

Who is the polluter?

There was a recent piece on Eco Business about Singapore’s packaging recycling scheme being delayed and how the polluter-pays principle seems to have failed to take hold in this particular situation. It was partly because of a speech by an activist in the recent SG Climate Rally.

The principle of polluter-pays is important because it helps to internalise the social cost of pollution and allows the market to price it in correctly. The result would be that the production and eventual consumption of the relevant goods stays at the level which is socially optimum.

Product packaging is itself a massive problem where it is clear certain social costs of the waste production is not properly internalised. The fact that supply chains are such that buying a new product is cheaper than the refill version, and the fact that massive amounts of materials are used in packaging without producers having to foot the cost of disposal, seems to be an issue. But the situation is also because waste management is not properly priced. Today, in Singapore, the amount of cost you shoulder for waste disposal is based on where you live and the type of dwelling you live in rather than the amount of waste you generate. This in itself is already not exactly adhering to the polluter-pay principle.

Creating a plastic bottle or aluminum can refund scheme would also jack up the cost of the products but sometimes we forget who are actually the polluters. The ultimate polluters are still the consumers and in making our purchase decisions, if we recognise the cost to the environment and decide that accordingly, it changes the dynamics of the situation and allows the producers to ‘suffer’ the cost from the lack of demand despite the low-ish prices. But that still doesn’t produce a very reliable signal in the marketplace. And that’s why it makes sense to properly ‘tax’ the producers or the consumers somehow to get the market back in line.

As it turns out, the identification of the polluter does not matter much. What matters is that the associated product gets the pollution priced in somehow. You can charge even the shops that are stocking the products. The reason is that the cost will reverberate through the supply chain; the higher price will result in less customers buying it, sending a demand signal that reduces the orders and stocking by the shop, who will order less from their suppliers and so on. Eventually, at the default price point the producer will realise the market isn’t taking as much of the product that they are producing hence reducing their production and hopefully the pollution as well.

The tricky issue is pricing the pollution and getting a sense of how much the marginal reduction in production could reduce the pollution. This is tricky because the average pollution per product isn’t the same as the marginal pollution. And indeed you may have to curb consumption/production very drastically in order to reduce a bit of pollution if there is significant non-linearity involved. I won’t go into the mathematics here but suffice to say, there is reluctance to tinker too much with the pricing of more ‘ordinary’ consumer goods in Singapore. And it might be a shame for sustainability.

Gas in households

When corporates purchase carbon credits and try to ‘offset’ their emissions, environmental groups would accuse them of greenwashing and to a certain extent, tokenism. Yet when Victoria state government bans gas in new homes from 2024, environmental groups were pleased and herald it as some degree or progress and victory.

It is easy to pass this off as a big move. Developers of new homes may have more planning restrictions. Those buying new homes will need to stop using gas. Gas demand growth from households will slow down but gas use in homes are a really tiny fraction of 17% contribution to the state’s emissions by the gas sector.

At the system level, Victoria’s grid emission factor in 2022 is actually such that it emits 4.6 times more carbon dioxide equivalent than combusting piped gas for an equivalent amount of energy. You can easily work that out by consulting the greenhouse emission factors published each year. Of course, I’m probably ignoring some of the emissions associated with the distribution part of things and also with fugitives. The reason for this big difference is the presence of coal-fired power plants on Victoria’s grid. In any case, all renewable energy injected into the grid from wind and solar will be used. Coal-fired power plants provide the baseload and gas-fired power plants usually absorb the additional load demand. What this means is that during the times (early morning or in the evenings) when you’re using electricity for heating or cooking in households, it is quite likely you’re consuming more gas fired power than solar power (whose generation peak in the mid-day).

There are questions on the efficiency of the whole process. Burning gas at power plants and converting them to electricity will result in some energy loss, and then using the electricity to convert it back to heat will mean a bit more losses (less than at the power plant of course); so heat applications for electricity isn’t all that efficient.

And then there is the question of energy bills. Whether you are consuming gas directly in the house or indirectly through electricity in the system, you are going to bear the cost of the gas that is consumed. In Australia, a large proportion of the cost of energy isn’t really in the energy itself but the share of cost that goes into infrastructure, especially that of distribution. Going full electric in households serves to help decarbonise the system only when the renewable electricity is supplied during the times when household’s demand peak. For solar, this is unlikely to be the case unless the household installs its own battery system to charge when solar generation is peak in mid-day. Batteries, additional distribution network assets to cater to peak renewable generation, are all infrastructure that will add to the cost of electricity.

So let us be honest about it: banning gas in residential use is unlikely to move the needle much in terms of decarbonisation in the electricity system right now. At least not all that much in Victoria. It is going to push the problem upstream where it can potentially be managed better. But a lot more actions will have to be taken. Would it improve indoor air quality for homes? Maybe, if your house is not properly ventilated but I doubt it is a very serious issue. Would it really reduce energy bills across the household? Quite unlikely. What it could accomplish is some degree of tokenism to pacify the groups of people who thinks it is a good idea.

Yet it is probably a setback for decarbonisation because we are narrowing ourselves to decarbonise by using a narrow set of technologies and forgetting about the ability to decarbonise gas through biomethane.

Sniffing industrialism

Professional services are inherently somewhat personal kind of service that depends a lot on the team delivering the service – not just because of the expertise required and involved but also the extent the team actually understands and care about the problem that clients have.

When one enters a professional service environment, it becomes easy to sniff out industrialism when you note that the bosses are just acting as managers, thinking about how they can increase more sales, upsell customers and mainly care about the metrics involved for sales but not delivery. And then when it comes to delivery, the culture is about doing the minimum, leveraging irrelevant previous work, failing to live up to promises.

We have all seen the big consultancies deliver such stuff. Perhaps especially the big four. Mariana Mazzucato talks about it in the Big Con. Workers need to sniff out industrialism in this sector and learn to opt out of it – by leaving or changing the way they serve. Clients need to sniff that out by walking away. The reason why such industrialism perpetuates is because clients sign up for them – they put procurement departments, try to boil everything down to basic metrics and uni-dimensional issues, and negotiate lower prices, driving vendors to cut back on service.

We’ve had decades of doing more, extracting more productivity out of our assets, workers and even vendors. Like the big fossil, you might think you’re winning, until you realise you’ve just driven the world to its end.