Whether it’s climate tech or climate or sustainability startups, I’ve been encountering them recently. Of course, they are just startup companies, looking to find a product-market fit and then scale their business. There is a massive distraction in today’s market where you could grow a business out of making grant applications and putting together plans, where you try to get funding to take off.
This sounds a lot more like research in academia than the economics of a free market. While government is hoping to drive the development of good climate solutions, they are still tapping on the market where it failed, doing so through what they believe are ways to keep things market-driven when they have actually replaced the market and allowed the grant application processes to pick winners.
The challenge is that the winners picked through a grant application process are not going to be the type who wins in the market. These are firms who would have scrutinized the fine print, delivered on arbitrary KPIs and proxies that some bureaucrat came up with in his or her office. And these schemes are just distracting time, money and resources away from the startups towards satisfying governance requirements. After all, ‘it is taxpayers’ money”
The work of growing a new industrial ecosystem isn’t easy and I’ve spent considerable part of my career thinking about ecosystems, value chains, bottlenecks in developing an industry. If the government can give some demand assurance perhaps for a specific project, or product that the customer would be able to use or satisfied with, then it could help. And very often, if politicians want to be able to make claims about having supported one particular development then things becomes more difficult, not easy. When economic support is driven by a desire for narratives rather than allowing the stories to emerge from a system that is created, you can get a poorly specified policy.
I wrote about experience curve pricing and how China executed it as their industrial policy and successfully developed dominance in several sectors. It is hard work, and it takes a lot out of the economy, but it pays off subsequently.
The problem with Singapore is that we keep hitting up our scale limits. When we successfully bet on the right industries that have incredible growing demand, we end up expanding to our space and resource limits that we have to cede our dominance to others.
One good example was the manufacturing of actuators for hard disks. Singapore once had almost 70% market share for the production of that. Imagine that the majority of hard disks used in the world’s PCs had actuators that were manufactured in Singapore. But as the demand expanded significantly, companies like Toshiba, Seagate-Maxtor which had plants in Singapore faced a problem – they didn’t have enough space to add additional lines in their manufacturing facilities in Singapore. Of course, cost of manpower was also rising – and so they started to set their sights on other ASEAN markets for these manufacturing activities.
Singapore just had to keep going up the value chain; and it gets harder and harder to be able to bet on the right products that had good growth or stable demand externally. Most of the time, these demand were captured by the international companies first, and then when they set up their supply base in Singapore, they are effectively bringing that demand to Singapore. That was how we expanded our economy and ‘created’ markets for our economy.
There were still Singapore businesses which were successful in finding opportunities overseas and managed to capture demand externally. But how many of them were actually creating manufacturing in Singapore? How many of them actually brought most of their supply chain through our economy? It was probably quite limited because Singapore was either too expensive or simply not efficient to run them through Singapore. Besides, Singapore doesn’t even have much integrated full-scale supply chains within the country – we are merely one of the stops or churning out one particular part, or assembling some of the components for something much bigger eventually.
So, the experience curve strategy may not work well in Singapore. Yet what then could have that same sort of sticky effect that Singapore’s development can run on? What can generate persistent advantages that are self-reinforcing, without relying on a massive scale, and that do not hit up against our scale limits? We used to sell our ability to integrate and coordinate, but in my opinion, we will run up against it due to increasing size and increasingly siloed areas of specialisation. Besides, that advantage is limited to the government departments.
I think we are lacking focus when it comes to finding a particular niche that we can get into, which initially does not have sufficient scale but could be stewarded into success. It could be focusing on being excellent in a small area which has some natural scale limits in the global markets yet able to fit under the natural limits in Singapore. It could be in making something technically sophisticated that forms a small component of something that many other parts of the world will use for producing everything else. And then organising ourselves to make sure we truly dominate in that space – through strong lobbying and advocacy efforts in other countries and marketing ourselves strongly towards whoever is the end or intermediate users who have the ability to influence and bring that end-demand to Singapore.
We only need a basket of those areas of excellence and strong value proposition to fill our economy and survive. But I may be wrong about it.
I wrote about the government blunting their policies previously when it comes to SME grants, particularly in Singapore. The same applies to many countries where policy directions are not just unclear but constantly changing. In the energy transition world, so many projects and companies in the US were taking investment decisions on the basis of tax credits for production of renewable energy.
So when the fate of the tax credits was suddenly called into question, it massively derailed the plans of these companies and projects, resulting in a whole sector or industrial sub-segment seizing up. I have always thought it’s incredible that in Europe and US, you could build an entire business or project based on revenues that are only possible because of subsidies or government tax credits. That’s amazing to me because in Asia, companies do not rely on government subsidies to build their business cases. At least not the private companies who have no political influence.
The reason for that is that the private sector is unwilling to take a lot of the regulatory risks from the Asian government, and they are not sure about the longevity of those policies and incentives. They recognise that when leadership changes, these incentives could disappear (as it happened in the US most recently). In other words, those policy measures in Asia are actually pretty blunt because the private sector is not going to respond to it much. US government risk that happening and losing such a precious lever to influence the economy and coordinate the change that is required.
Likewise, in Singapore, one of the biggest advantage that the government have is the ability to coordinate change properly. Technically, they don’t need to use market-based mechanisms to do that, but decades of indoctrination about the need to use free-market capitalism to ensure efficiency have brought us to the approach taken these days. The topic of subsidies is tricky and often at the top level, the thinking is ‘who would not want subsidies and freebies for their business?’ Yet in practice, it is not so easy. But it is not the bureaucracy that companies are unwilling to engage with – it is the uncertainty around the discretion of agencies’ decisions on whether some company or activity merits the funding.
Often, if the government’s grants or subsidies are uncertain and criteria are flexibly applied to accept or reject applications, then companies would rather focus on dealing with the vicissitudes of the market than of the government. I’m writing these because I feel that our agencies could inadvertently undermine something precious that the government have built up in the past. The full implications can only be seen and experience when it’s probably too late.
I realise I’ve never written on artificial intelligence. GenAI swept the world quite a bit over the past 2 years and of course, the consciousness of it in the market since ChatGPT was made available for public use had driven Nvidia’s stocks up insanely.
I had realised that since I’ve got a collection of writings in the public domain from since 2009, it would not be hard for me to train an LLM to be able to almost think and write like me at least to the extent of views, ideas and information I have expressed.
The truth is I’ve somehow avoided using AI to do my work; rather, I’ve been using it more to gather and synthesize information, help me identify blindspots and figure out perspectives I might have missed. I know that what we have observed in the publicly available tools is just displaying a fraction of their potential and capability but I feel that ultimately, we are still hitting back at the same constraints that holds us back as humans. Resource.
AI continues to suck up computing power, materials and energy in order to work. This is almost silly to the extent that we are feeding machines copious amount of energy in order to produce output that pale in comparison with a human being. ‘Biological energy’ so to speak, is far superior and we already have the human brain that allows all of us to perform at a far higher and more meaningful level. Of course there are lots of ethical and safety issues confronting us as we develop AI further, and I’m not decided whether we should necessarily stop the developments – all I can say is that we are getting distracted by AI.
We are embarking on an almost insane hype in the market for AI while ignoring the greater problem that confronts mankind today – climate change. And we ignore it at our peril. AI, like the many other engineered geopolitical crises, are chipping away at our attention, energies and resources to deal with the things that matters much more.
I really believe we can do so much better with the struggles and challenges in this world if we had not been distracted by these things. I have no doubt AI is going to be important and influential, but along with a lot of other innovations that have radically changed our lives, it may only serve to exacerbate problems that are still not well appreciated by us, while taking away resources to solve the problems that are apparent today.
Having worked in consulting across cultures, I have begun to recognise some cultural behaviours when buying consulting across different countries and the attitudes towards consultants. Having advisors is nothing new; the monarchs of ancient times have had advisors to support them for as long as they existed. These advisors offered more than just advice, insights or knowledge that leaders did not possess (or did not think they possessed).
They offered assurances when it was scarce. Soothsaying, contrary to what people might think, actually means telling the truth; with ‘sooth’ being an old English term that meant truth, as opposed to ‘soothe’, which means to calm. And the advisors also provided perspectives that during times of wiser monarchs, could contradict the conventional wisdom or call out the folly of the leaders.
So if we distil it down to the value that consultants provide today:
Knowledge of what may not be known to the client: this is when consultants are selling their expertise, and familiarity with a topic area that clients are not familiar with
Assurance of a particular course of action, decision, or information: this is when the client needs something verified, checked, validated and confirmed. The confidence and conviction of the advisor matter here as well, compared to those who hide behind jargon and ‘expert lingo’.
Sparing partner or challenger to ideas: consultants can be valued in bringing new perspectives, especially an outside-in view of things thereby co-creating more valuable solutions or decisions with the client.
I begin to recognise that Asian firms especially with rather paternalistic leadership tend not to use consultants the way the West use them. So for example, when it comes to knowledge, the Western clients may appreciate specific subject matter expertise that comes through years of experience and in-depth research. In contrast, Eastern clients may value knowledge of implicit/unwritten local rules and norms rather than expertise in a more technical subject. The more institutionalisable the knowledge set is, the less likely an Eastern client would appreciate it as worth paying for.
Western clients see assurances from consultants as important while Eastern clients prefer to take the risks of not having check through things by themselves. This might have something to do with the way trust is formed. In Asian societies where getting things verified can be read as a sign of mistrust, it is challenging to value such independent checks and perspectives. The very deed of using independent validation can almost be an insult.
Finally, when it comes to having a sparing partner, the typical harmony-loving, and conflict-avoidant Asian culture would really struggle with the idea of paying someone to challenge you. In fact, leaders might instead assert the power of their wealth/influence over people so that they would not be questioned.
In this sense, Asian cultures tend towards getting advisors who can provide knowledge that is undocumented and unavailable in the public domain, and are often independent individuals with the specific gifts of being able to reveal ‘truth’ to the client. They also prefer that the knowledge advisors gain about the client cannot be easily disseminated. And as far as possible, they only care about knowledge that cannot be institutionalised.
This means that it is incredibly challenging for most professional, western-chain consultants to survive solely from serving a pool of Asian clients. If anything, they usually have to ‘survive’ off the big multi-nationals who are growing into new, and perhaps opaque markets, or needing more capacity support. In other words, consulting has grown out of an increasingly international market, yet not overly uncertain because surely some stability is necessary for consultants to be deemed to have accumulated enough lessons and experience to share.
Random musings as I continue to build up my knowledge and capability of managing a consulting practice.
These days I more often talk about biofuels and bioenergy than hydrogen. Mostly because I believe that bioenergy is the best scaffolding that is available in the market for commercializing hydrogen for renewable fuel use massively.
I moderated a panel at AlterCOP 29 last year, where I help to spark some discussions about what hydrogen is good for and what could help hydrogen be a solution for decarbonisation, if at all.
There hasn’t been too much changes in fundamentals since we had that discussion but we know that a lot of bad news about hydrogen have plagued the industry since the start of this year.
Most recently, McPhy, the electrolyser manufacturer liquidated with most assets taken over by John Cockerill. One of the chief issues is that the industry has grown so much on the back of anticipated and realised policies without improving its commercial case over the same period of time.
As a result, the solution continues to be commercially challenging and expectations of handouts from government have reduced the drive to improve commercial case.
Some interesting announcements and updates were coming out of Ecosperity last week. Most of them oriented around financing of the transition. This is an important topic considering that a lot of our existing economic system is locked into high carbon intensity systems because of financial incentives. Being able to change the incentives can help adoption of more emission-reduction measures.
Transition credits
Launched in 2023, a coalition of players were studying the use and deployment of transition credits. Verra also started working on a proper methodology to account for the carbon emission reductions from transition; and they launched it last week. Since the initial MAS announcement, the Acen Coal-fired power plant in the Philippines have become a candidate for a project that will issue transition credits in exchange for shortening the project’s tenure. And Mitsubishi also announced joining the team of firms taking a stake in the consortium that will generate the transition credits. The idea is that the consortium could then sell off the transition credits to players in Singapore who can then offset the carbon taxes; and there is hope to do the same for Japan.
I believe there is interest for these players to also participate in developing more renewable energy projects in the Philippines to help make up for the shortfall of power generation. After all, the article linked above quoted Rockerfeller Foundation that the shortfall will require “1,000MW of solar, 250MW of wind, and 1,000MW of battery energy storage”. Not sure if it comes as a surprise to all, but because of resource availability, solar and wind farms are not ‘always-on’. They only generate a fraction of their nameplate capacities most of the time, which means a lot more capacities must be built to produce the same amount of gross energy. Energy storage is needed to help time-shift the energy to when required.
WEF-GenZero aviation initiative
Launched as ‘Green Fuel Forward’ – it is a capacity-building initiative that is aimed at drawing in airlines, refiners, logistics companies, banks and others. I think the idea of building up capacity to deal with the entire SAF ecosystem is useful. Aviation decarbonisation over the next few decades disproportionately depends on SAF. It is good that the global aviation industry have more or less settled on this particular decarbonisation pathway and is developing various tools to be able to adopt it.
More than just using a different fuel, it involves getting customers to share in the higher cost of the fuel. How to do so is the issue; and all the airlines are afraid of the ticket pricing affecting their competitive position. Different approaches to distributing the emission reduction costs have been mooted: (1) some like the idea of a corporate decarbonisation programme where partners are gathered together and somehow agree to some formula to share the cost of the low-carbon fuel premium; (2) others think we could convert the emission reductions into some kind of credits to be sold to freighters or passengers who are on board those flights. Those methods involve using airlines as the market-maker for emissions reduction.
The customers of airlines especially the corporate players will need to determine their strategy when it comes to flight carbon emission abatement, as well as the budget they can allot to it. For now, corporate probably have some kind of trip budget – they might have to scale it down based on the SAF prices they are expecting. The airlines themselves will have to develop their own strategy of allocating the cost of SAF to passengers or corporate customers. And of course they can then issue or bundle the SAF-credits (SAF-C) accordingly.
As stated in the ST article on this initiative, each SAF-C means a reduction of 2.5-2.8 tonnes of carbon emissions. Assuming that each SAF-C is priced exactly equals to the premium that airlines pay for SAF above their conventional jet fuel, you’re looking at about US$1000-1,600 for each SAF-C. Now in comparison, a typical carbon credit (representing 1 tonne of carbon dioxide abatement) out in the market is selling at around US$3-4; or if it’s CORSIA-eligible, maybe US$20? So corporates are going to have quite some difficulty working out what is worth paying for SAF-C if you were supposing there was going to be some kind of market and price-discovery for those credits. Does it mean the airlines will have to pass on the rest of the cost shortfall to other customers? Then why do only the SAF-C buyers get to claim the reductions?
A lot of capacity-building will be needed and a proper vision for the workings of the ecosystem worked out.
Singapore government’s clean energy fund
There was yet another announcement about US$500m fund that Singapore government is going to deploy for green projects in the region, as part of the new ‘office’ that MAS is going to set up (named FAST-P). That’s actually going to be really interesting though the news was very scarce on details. I suppose they just wanted to announce some parameters they have decided during Ecosperity week while many other things are still being worked on.
We know there will be 3 pillars: (1) accelerating the energy transition away from fossil fuels to clean energy, (2) ramping up green investments, and (3) decarbonising emissions-intensive sectors like cement and steel production. I suppose the first pillar might relate to the transition credits mentioned earlier. The FAST-P office will probably be spending more efforts for (2) because that will be a lot more complex and require someone to drive or coordinate across different parties. It is not clear how (3) can be done when those sectors are likely the beneficiaries themselves either through energy efficiency investments or fuel/electricity substitution.
Having been involved in the set-up of Infrastructure Asia some 7 years ago, I am fully aware of how much effort behind the scenes just to get the resources together, not to mention the actual work of setting up the office. The work to be done by the office is really to identify the activities where it is worthwhile helping to reduce the riskiness of other financiers or funder. The metric would probably be more impact driven though for the sake of Singapore’s economy, it would be necessary to require anchoring some activities out of Singapore.
I think it’s really great to see how the various entities within the Singapore government or related organs (and I’m almost definitely stretching that by implying platforms like Genzero, which is part of Temasek, and some of those Singapore firms dealing in transition credits) are trying to tackle the issue of the transition, not just for Singapore but for the region.
This year, the EU mandated 2% Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) blending in all airports feeding into aeroplanes. The definitions of SAF for EU is clear, mostly based on a whitelist of feedstocks that are proven to be ‘sustainable’ and achieves a high level of carbon emissions reduction on a lifecycle basis (70% or more compared to A1 Jet Fuels). Unlike CORSIA, which puts the onus on airlines to reduce their emissions from jet fuels, RefuelEU regulations put the responsibility on fuel suppliers that supply to the airports. These suppliers will need to quote their prices to airlines accounting for these regulations, and while airlines don’t have to deal with the hassle of making sure the blend is correct to meet compliance requirements, they will need to bear the increased costs.
Now, there are also similar SAF regulations in the US under Renewable Fuel Standards, but their requirements for feedstocks and lifecycle carbon emissions reductions are different. Just to caveat first that I’m way less familiar with the US standards and requirement but based off some work from my colleagues, I understand they are less stringent, defining SAF to require 50% reduction in lifecycle carbon emissions compared to conventional jet fuels. This allows feedstocks such as corn ethanol, or other dedicated energy crop-based feedstocks (including canola, other oilseed crops) to be used for their SAF.
And if you refer back to the ICAO standards set under CORSIA, they only require that there’s 10% reduction in carbon emissions. It is still unclear to me what would constitute ‘SAF’ to the countries in Asia Pacific that are all introducing some SAF volumetric blending mandate.
One of the key challenges with just defining a standard threshold for carbon reduction and then setting a volumetric SAF target is that you don’t incentivise SAF producers to reduce their lifecycle carbon emissions. It becomes a race to the bottom for the airlines or fuel suppliers to buy the cheapest SAF that meets the threshold for compliance. If instead, we set a carbon emission reduction target and require the blend to achieve that target, then we can benefit from a greater diversity of SAF feedstocks and pathways that meets the economics on the basis of a unit carbon abatement cost. After all, the carbon emission reduction is the piece of value we care about for SAF at the moment, won’t it be better to price that?
I haven’t looked closely into the numbers, but one cannot help but realise that those markets that have grown well over the past few decades, but where stock exchanges or equity multiples have been relatively pathetic in performance, tend to have exceptional performance in the real estate market. Cases that come to mind include Singapore, China, Vietnam and perhaps more recently, Hong Kong.
This makes the proposal from Singapore government on trying to boost the stock exchange in Singapore through this ‘Equity Market Development Programme (EQDP)’ pretty interesting. The initial idea is to have funds that inject liquidity into companies in the SGX beyond just those represented in the broad market index. Mechanics aside, I don’t know how well the intentions are conveyed by the government. Maybe they think it is too sensitive to share or too controversial. I think it’s more interesting to consider the intent properly than the mechanics or the chances of success at this point.
The issue with wealth getting tied up with the real estate market in Singapore and especially for Singaporeans is that it is illiquid as an asset; the value growth can be quite uneven, and more significantly, housing is a necessity so when it becomes a way in which majority of the people store their wealth, it prevents the newcomers from entering the market. Across generations, it can lead to severe distortions in terms of affordability. Home ownership is seen as a cornerstone in the formation of community and Singapore society – owning a home gives us a physical stake, and more importantly, it leads us to take actions that are more long-term when it comes to caring for our surroundings.
So in my mind, the EQDP is more about trying to activate and encourage overall movement of wealth towards the stock market rather than the housing market. After all, not everyone needs to hold a piece of stock but everyone needs a shelter above their heads. We’d rather have asset price inflation in the stock market than to have it in our housing market. Besides, the liquidity of Singaporeans has probably been contributing to the asset price inflation in the stock markets in the US. So why not keep them at home? This, I think is probably a more significant intent for EQDP than just thinking about financial markets development. And I think this social intent is probably more admirable than the calculative sense of how much more economic benefit or mileage we can get out of the markets in Singapore or the spill over financial services impact it can create.
Now whether the mechanisms proposed as part of the EQDP makes sense or not, I’ll perhaps comment some other day. And maybe when it is clearer what it would be.
I don’t think we’re being imaginative or aggressive enough with tackling climate issues. Nor are we thinking about how to sync-up our efforts to grow our economies, improve lives together with environmental conservation efforts. There are plenty of false dichotomies that result from how we’ve developed our economies. It’s haunting us and discouraging us from thinking in worthy directions for problem-solving.
One example of a dichotomy that may turn out to be false in the long run is the issue of food versus fuel. The food shortage problems today is driven by logistics and localised disaster more than aggregate unavailability or insufficiency. If anything, instead of trying to outright ban dedicated energy crops or crop-based feedstocks for biofuel production, it would be wiser to encourage a programme of reducing desertification and farming of marginal land with resilient crops that can be used as feedstocks for biofuels.
Another involves questioning of thermodynamically-unappealing solutions. Direct air capture (DAC) requires that energy is so cheap that you should mechanically capture the carbon dioxide from the air with machines. And yes, it doesn’t take as much land per unit of carbon captured. It could even compete with vegetation/forests. One could consider through the lens of this competition with nature: Forests takes about 860 square km of land to absorb 1 million tonnes of carbon dioxide whereas if you were to build a DAC plant plus a solar farm powering it which can capture 1 million tonnes of carbon dioxide a year would only take about 30 square km, which is ~3.4% of the land area. [my calculations are back-of-envelope and derived from unit figures here and here].
Yes, but then what about the limited lifespan and all the value chain emissions from making solar panels and DAC systems? Indeed, those trade-offs are worth thinking about, which is why we probably won’t advocate replacing natural habitats and forests with DAC. A forest is more than just sequestering carbon, but also provides other ecosystem services such as enhancing biodiversity, increasing groundwater supply, and even helping to clean the water and reducing the risks of desertification.
At some level, biofuels compete with synthetic or e-fuels; and biomethane perhaps is imagined to compete with hydrogen. But all of these are false dichotomies. The world needs us to keep working on different solutions and coordinate our efforts to scale them where they make sense. One can be purist about different things and get nowhere. Let’s try to lay out the trade-offs and work through those in specific contexts rather than seek to rule out solutions on the whole.
