
I wrote about experience curve pricing and how China executed it as their industrial policy and successfully developed dominance in several sectors. It is hard work, and it takes a lot out of the economy, but it pays off subsequently.
The problem with Singapore is that we keep hitting up our scale limits. When we successfully bet on the right industries that have incredible growing demand, we end up expanding to our space and resource limits that we have to cede our dominance to others.
One good example was the manufacturing of actuators for hard disks. Singapore once had almost 70% market share for the production of that. Imagine that the majority of hard disks used in the world’s PCs had actuators that were manufactured in Singapore. But as the demand expanded significantly, companies like Toshiba, Seagate-Maxtor which had plants in Singapore faced a problem – they didn’t have enough space to add additional lines in their manufacturing facilities in Singapore. Of course, cost of manpower was also rising – and so they started to set their sights on other ASEAN markets for these manufacturing activities.
Singapore just had to keep going up the value chain; and it gets harder and harder to be able to bet on the right products that had good growth or stable demand externally. Most of the time, these demand were captured by the international companies first, and then when they set up their supply base in Singapore, they are effectively bringing that demand to Singapore. That was how we expanded our economy and ‘created’ markets for our economy.
There were still Singapore businesses which were successful in finding opportunities overseas and managed to capture demand externally. But how many of them were actually creating manufacturing in Singapore? How many of them actually brought most of their supply chain through our economy? It was probably quite limited because Singapore was either too expensive or simply not efficient to run them through Singapore. Besides, Singapore doesn’t even have much integrated full-scale supply chains within the country – we are merely one of the stops or churning out one particular part, or assembling some of the components for something much bigger eventually.
So, the experience curve strategy may not work well in Singapore. Yet what then could have that same sort of sticky effect that Singapore’s development can run on? What can generate persistent advantages that are self-reinforcing, without relying on a massive scale, and that do not hit up against our scale limits? We used to sell our ability to integrate and coordinate, but in my opinion, we will run up against it due to increasing size and increasingly siloed areas of specialisation. Besides, that advantage is limited to the government departments.
I think we are lacking focus when it comes to finding a particular niche that we can get into, which initially does not have sufficient scale but could be stewarded into success. It could be focusing on being excellent in a small area which has some natural scale limits in the global markets yet able to fit under the natural limits in Singapore. It could be in making something technically sophisticated that forms a small component of something that many other parts of the world will use for producing everything else. And then organising ourselves to make sure we truly dominate in that space – through strong lobbying and advocacy efforts in other countries and marketing ourselves strongly towards whoever is the end or intermediate users who have the ability to influence and bring that end-demand to Singapore.
We only need a basket of those areas of excellence and strong value proposition to fill our economy and survive. But I may be wrong about it.