Commentary Archives

Political culture

Woke Salaryman recently posted this comic article in response to comments towards a previous post about workplace ‘politics’. I really like the realism, the clarity and conviction behind their work. I think it is great that they call out the naivety of those who thinks that they can be ‘above’ politics at work but I’m writing this post because I want to add a more nuance layer to the conversation.

I think Singapore, by and large, have always been sensitive to overt kinds of politicking because of the way politics have been portrayed in our history. We take a more superficial view of what politics mean, as though it is all bad and about behaving in deceptive or conniving, self-serving ways.

And in the workplace, we default to thinking that the virtuous approach is simply to bury head and work hard. That can be a great start in a small working team or organisation where visibility isn’t really a problem. It also works well when productivity, key work metrics are not contentious. Then politicking can seem like it’s all about bootlicking, gossiping and acting in the worse, socially destructive ways.

Politics, which is derived from greek words meaning ‘affairs of a city’ is fundamentally relating to governance and interactions between fellow beings living in the same environment, subject to different constraints and influences that are interdependent on one another in the community. The relationship-building, social interactions, tussle for power, influence or mind-share are all part of it. In a workplace, where we are all coming together to achieve something together, it takes effort and the meta-layer of ‘work’ to organise everyone together.

Work today has evolved and become increasingly complex; it is hard to measure individual effort easily, and particularly challenging to identify precisely what the right skillsets are to progress to the next level. It is ultimately the ability to organise others and persuade them to work together that produces value as opposed to working and contributing directly.

There is a role for politics in all of lives, and maybe Singapore needs to build a culture of politcal-awareness and also encourage citizens to appreciate the positive role it can play in society, workplaces. And we may all also learn the right social, emotional intellect needed to handle tricky situations. With the geopolitical climate of the world today, Singapore needs to cultivate more brilliant diplomats than ever before. How else to do so than to help our people recognise the value of such work to the survival and success of a city state nation.

Policy crowding out

Is job creation the responsibility of the government or businesses/entrepreneurs?

Sure, most governments in capitalistic democracies work hard to reduce red tape, improve ease of doing business and provide all kinds of support to businesses. But can policies to create jobs end up crowding out the private sector activities that create jobs, perhaps even undermining the private sector activities?

For example, when EDB in Singapore attracts MNCs that comes into Singapore and starts hiring, providing good and stable jobs, do they end up disincentivising prospective entrepreneurs from starting their own business? Do they also bid up the cost of strong junior hires for the local companies that need them more? Do the companies that comes into the Singapore market compete out local firms who may have been able to perform the same services in the local economy?

Is there a risk that existing investments in the market hold-hostage our domestic policies? Take, for example, the oil & gas industry in Singapore; do its presence slow down our climate policy? Would the fact that government is busy attracting companies and making things smoother for them cause them to compete more effectively with other local companies who may not have that same support from our own government?

Just bringing up the questions worth pondering over. I’ve no answers but I think it’s worth actually looking into actual data and finding ways to understand some of the answers to these questions I’ve raised.

Understanding carbon intensity versus fuel emissions

One of the reasons I’m writing this article is that Asia Pacific is increasingly recognising the role of renewable and alternative fuels, especially biofuels. And one of the ‘measures’ of sustainability of these fuels, which may be low or zero carbon in emissions, is the carbon intensity (Scope 3). However, it often gets confused with the fuel emissions (Scope 1), and so I thought it was worth explaining clearly.

Fuel decarbonisation is so critical that it covers part of decarbonising electricity generation. Relying on a mix of intermittent renewable generation with short-duration storage in the power system is very challenging. Gas peakers are going to be integral in a system that has a significant share of wind and solar power. Yet there are concerns about carbon emissions associated with gas.

Decarbonising natural gas use and other liquid fuel-use remains a critical lever to achieve net zero by 2050. Renewable fuels, especially biofuels, enable a drop-in solution that bridges our immediate decarbonisation needs with future alternative fuel, or complete electric solutions. There are concerns however, with the sustainability of biofuels, and one of the ‘measures’ of sustainability of these fuels, is the carbon intensity of it.

The carbon intensity of the fuel refers to the lifecycle carbon emitted in the production of the fuel, usually expressed in gCO2e/MJ (reads: grammes of carbon dioxide equivalent per mega-joules). For fuel that is zero emissions, or non-reckonable carbon emissions, there are still carbon emissions associated with its production, processing and transportation before its energy is used. And so if it’s being transported from such a location, or that too much logistics were involved in its feedstock collection, those emissions gets accounted for in this carbon intensity metric. EU use thresholds for carbon intensity to determine if the fuel is ‘sustainable’ or not – on the basis that if the fuel does not achieve a level of emissions reduction, then it cannot be considered renewable.

As should be clear by now, carbon intensity is different from the concept of fuel emissions. The carbon intensity value is not reflective of the emissions of the fuel itself but more of its lifecycle, making it a Scope 3 emission as opposed to Scope 1. Take, for example, a regime where there is a carbon tax associated with fuel emissions, the carbon intensity of the fuel would not actually be considered within the calculation of the carbon tax at all – especially if the tax is designed only to apply to Scope 1 (direct emissions).

However, such a regime where a carbon tax is applied to Scope 1, should be mindful that they do not end up incentivising the use of “low-carbon fuel” that have overly high carbon intensities. Because this would defeat the purpose of trying to price the carbon emission as the direct emissions become displaced by emissions in some other parts of the fuel supply chain.

Carbon intensity is also why the International Maritime Organisation have been pushing for the Net Zero Framework that considers the ‘well-to-wake’ emissions (lifecycle emissions) instead of the ‘tank-to-wake’ (direct Scope 1) emissions. If we are focused only on the ‘tank-to-wake’ emissions, then technically, grey hydrogen or grey ammonia would have zero carbon emissions. We don’t want a case where the emissions are not reduced at the system level but just shifted from one part of the value chain to another – that’s why we care about the carbon intensity of a fuel, not just its direct emissions.

It’s probably worth pointing out I first wrote this article on linkedin and you can find it here.

Advancement through dilemmas

As I ponder over the paradoxes of our society and nature, I begin to see more and more how our traditional linear paradigms about advancement and growth jars too much against reality.

There are many things that appears contradictory and yet continue to co-exist peacefully in the world without apparent conflict except in our minds. There are tyrants who are charismatic, loved and admired but also incompetent democratically elected leaders who could set a country back by decades. And there are both decentralised and centralised systems that appear to thrive, and also implode.

We ask ourselves if history proceeds through its course regardless of individual’s actions and it is just collective macro force created by the tiny actions of every individual that matters, or that it progresses through the agency of a few, put in the positions of power and influence? It’s not clear at all.

So when we think that progress in the system involves maturity of technology, of having regulation, standardisation, proper rules of engagement in place, we also recognise that these things stifles innovation and block new, emergent contenders from taking over incumbent structures.

Similarly, having contending standards or technology pathways look as though they are going to create a gridlock that prevents the industry from adopting a single unified approach.

The western, perhaps Anglo-Saxon, thought models make it difficult to hold those juxtaposing, contradictory ideas together because it supposes that there is just this one way that is the right way.

What if that is not reality at all?

Climate startups

Whether it’s climate tech or climate or sustainability startups, I’ve been encountering them recently. Of course, they are just startup companies, looking to find a product-market fit and then scale their business. There is a massive distraction in today’s market where you could grow a business out of making grant applications and putting together plans, where you try to get funding to take off.

This sounds a lot more like research in academia than the economics of a free market. While government is hoping to drive the development of good climate solutions, they are still tapping on the market where it failed, doing so through what they believe are ways to keep things market-driven when they have actually replaced the market and allowed the grant application processes to pick winners.

The challenge is that the winners picked through a grant application process are not going to be the type who wins in the market. These are firms who would have scrutinized the fine print, delivered on arbitrary KPIs and proxies that some bureaucrat came up with in his or her office. And these schemes are just distracting time, money and resources away from the startups towards satisfying governance requirements. After all, ‘it is taxpayers’ money”

The work of growing a new industrial ecosystem isn’t easy and I’ve spent considerable part of my career thinking about ecosystems, value chains, bottlenecks in developing an industry. If the government can give some demand assurance perhaps for a specific project, or product that the customer would be able to use or satisfied with, then it could help. And very often, if politicians want to be able to make claims about having supported one particular development then things becomes more difficult, not easy. When economic support is driven by a desire for narratives rather than allowing the stories to emerge from a system that is created, you can get a poorly specified policy.

Trust in Singapore

As our nation crosses the diamond jubilee at SG60, people were putting down their wishes of ‘I want to…’ during NDP. The messages played on the videos for NDP were really inspiring and had nice stories from ordinary Singaporeans of diverse background. I felt genuinely moved and encouraged that we can be more than just ourselves and what we bring because Singapore is just a society that has been on the move, that has been developing and growing and thriving. It all feels good.

The stuff that doesn’t feel that good – how do we approach it though? The fact that places and spaces have been sacrificed, people uprooted to make way for development (as the Tekong story suggested). Or that sporting feels more like a lone wolf endeavour more than a national one, particularly during the ‘invisible phase’ of training, working towards Olympic qualifications, etc (story of Lloyd Valberg; though one can’t say this through that story since Singapore wasn’t yet a nation in 1948). Or that the big corporations often push around small businesses because that is ‘normal’ in our culture (story of Yanee; ‘but are you ready for an order of this scale’).

There is a choice to be made on how we see things. And whilst we have been told repeatedly there would be trade-offs, we haven’t yet learnt the real principles and intentions behind the decisions on those trade-offs. Why do we choose one over another? To the ones in places of power, it might be obvious. How could the sacrifice be made worthwhile for those suffering from its consequences?

What principles do we use to uphold our values – whether they are peace, justice or equality? Or perhaps progress? What happens when they are trading off each other? What if we cannot accomplish all of them at the same time? Often, ‘progress’ as the value seems to take centre stage. And is the kind of progress broad or narrowly defined?

To move forward, we must also learn unravel more the principles worth learning about and keeping, which we can use to navigate the future. Our forefathers left them for us but if we don’t pick them up to use them, it would be squandering the success that they’ve worked so hard to build us.

Blunting policies II

I wrote about the government blunting their policies previously when it comes to SME grants, particularly in Singapore. The same applies to many countries where policy directions are not just unclear but constantly changing. In the energy transition world, so many projects and companies in the US were taking investment decisions on the basis of tax credits for production of renewable energy.

So when the fate of the tax credits was suddenly called into question, it massively derailed the plans of these companies and projects, resulting in a whole sector or industrial sub-segment seizing up. I have always thought it’s incredible that in Europe and US, you could build an entire business or project based on revenues that are only possible because of subsidies or government tax credits. That’s amazing to me because in Asia, companies do not rely on government subsidies to build their business cases. At least not the private companies who have no political influence.

The reason for that is that the private sector is unwilling to take a lot of the regulatory risks from the Asian government, and they are not sure about the longevity of those policies and incentives. They recognise that when leadership changes, these incentives could disappear (as it happened in the US most recently). In other words, those policy measures in Asia are actually pretty blunt because the private sector is not going to respond to it much. US government risk that happening and losing such a precious lever to influence the economy and coordinate the change that is required.

Likewise, in Singapore, one of the biggest advantage that the government have is the ability to coordinate change properly. Technically, they don’t need to use market-based mechanisms to do that, but decades of indoctrination about the need to use free-market capitalism to ensure efficiency have brought us to the approach taken these days. The topic of subsidies is tricky and often at the top level, the thinking is ‘who would not want subsidies and freebies for their business?’ Yet in practice, it is not so easy. But it is not the bureaucracy that companies are unwilling to engage with – it is the uncertainty around the discretion of agencies’ decisions on whether some company or activity merits the funding.

Often, if the government’s grants or subsidies are uncertain and criteria are flexibly applied to accept or reject applications, then companies would rather focus on dealing with the vicissitudes of the market than of the government. I’m writing these because I feel that our agencies could inadvertently undermine something precious that the government have built up in the past. The full implications can only be seen and experience when it’s probably too late.

Blunting policies I

I started my first serious job with the Singapore government over a decade ago. Before that, I worked variously in education (math and economics tutor, and teaching assistant for undergraduates), as a freelance writer for a local economics magazine, and water treatment systems (B2C and B2B sales of drinking water filters and treatment units).

But I’ve been thinking about government policies and the institutions required to build a strong economy for almost two decades. This is partly because I was influenced by Dr Goh Keng Swee’s achievements to study economics. In particular, I thought a lot about industrial policies and the approaches taken for that in Singapore.

I was subsequently part of IE Singapore, and then Enterprise Singapore. They were agencies that provided grants to local companies for various activities. To avoid ‘picking winners’ in terms of selecting particular sectors to support, most of these incentive policies are broad sweeping – they were targeted at investments that enhanced productivity such as supporting automation, digitisation, etc. Sustainability was recently a key theme for some of these incentive schemes.

As I’ve been out of the system for a long time, my views are not based on what I know from inside the system but observations made from conversations with businesses on the outside. In all of these incentive schemes, there’s a strong emphasis on governance so the process takes a bit of time. Companies are encouraged to go ahead with their plans while the grant application is in process. This plays the role of reducing risks of delays to the companies’ plans but it also mean that the companies faces uncertainty on the final outlay/expenses that the government would cover.

The government exercises a significant amount of discretion when approving grants. This is a conclusion arrived at by consulting and digital service solution providers to the Small-medium Enterprises (SMEs) with solutions or services that were supported by the grants.

What eventually happens as a result is that incentive schemes by the government becomes weaker and weaker as a tool to encourage companies to take up new solutions or move in the direction of the government. In the short run, when government pushes out incentives to help SMEs with payment systems, or improve their marketing, or even start R&D, the SMEs will definitely start looking into this areas thinking it’s their chance to defray some of their costs of making such improvements and getting more competitive advantage. Some may even realise they should go into it with or without grant support. But a majority of them would not look deep enough to make that decision – instead, they’ll make the decision contingent on the availability of support. When their applications are either denied or the amount granted falls short of their expectations, a certain trust in the government is broken.

The next time these grants or incentives are peddled around, they no longer respond to them. They are skeptical about the government’s sincerity. This is especially if they had experienced cases where the rejection comes through technical grounds or when they expected a particular expense to be eligible due to vague policy wording, but eventually the agency exercised discretion to deny it.

In the long run, these policies gets more and more blunt, and public servants will be spending so much effort thinking about the policies, setting up governance procedures, only to realise that uptake of these incentives are poor. I wonder how much governments realise this is actually a problem for longer term policy-making and economic levers. As much as they try to use market-oriented levers, some of these intangible factors make a huge difference.

Experience curve pricing

So it started when I was reading Cedric Chin’s writing about Morris Chang, and then about Texas Instruments dominating semicon industry through the invention of the Learning Curve pricing. Here is a situation where a large company basically finances its product into dominance by sacrificing some early profits as they expect lower prices to generate sufficient demand to increase utilisation of their machine, improving product yield through improvements in the manufacturing process.

This enabled Texas Instruments to dominate the industry as the anticipated increase in manufacturing yield (as a result of the ‘learning curve’), enabled more aggressive pricing, pushing out competitors, increasing market share for Texas Instruments, and thereby creating more scale advantages to drive more yield improvements. This is a remarkable use of financing to use scale economies to dominate the market. Essentially, most of the digital tech companies tries to use this as a means to eventually dominate a market of their niche.

The original idea of the learning curve of course came with manufacturing, and I believe this idea was applied at the scale of the entire industry in China when it comes to solar panels, Li-on battery architecture and now probably electric vehicles. By massively subsidising the products and creating demand not just domestically but also in foreign markets, China successfully increased utilisation of their capital equipment, improved their manufacturing capabilities and cement their advantage further.

While other markets are still focused on ‘costs’ of deploying solar, or using batteries, China took a different perspective, one that was driven by manufacturing capabilities and learning curve. I believe Japan had desired such an approach as well, having been subsidising certain markets and technologies, including development of hydrogen cars as well as residential hydrogen appliances (see ENE-FARM home use fuel cell system).

Sometimes when we wonder if we are too early into the market for something, when it comes to the government that is willing to orchestrate a strategy at that sort of industrial level, one can mobilise the resources to create the future rather than wait for the right time.

All about energy transition

I’ve been fighting against the prevailing culture for the past decade of my career. And for those who blame things on culture and act like it cannot be changed, they are being delusional. I have a few examples to show:

How did we get from flagging for a cab on the street to punching our mobile phone screens to hail a cab?
How did we get from ‘solar power’ is too inefficient and there is not enough space in Singapore to targeting a 2GWp solar by 2030?
How did we get from being in kampongs where we helped each other and lived for generations in a house to thinking that our financial lives depend on getting BTO, then selling it after MOP and then upgrading non-stop over our adulthood?

While it takes time, culture can be changed. It also takes identifying some loose bricks in the existing edifice to overhaul the structure of our prevailing culture. Energy transition is one tough one to crack, but that said, our region in Southeast Asia has already moved quite a bit from the days of coal-fired power generation. Yes there was a bit of attempts to catch on with the hype around hydrogen but the dollars and sense prevailed at least for now.

So I’ve been toying with the idea of doing a lot more content to teach all of us about energy transition and to be able to learn together. There is a whole lot of de-stigmatising, trying things out, and unlearning our previous biases to be able to move the culture a bit and accelerate the transition. There’s a question of format, level of engagement, how to manage and nurture a community and so on. I guess I’ll have to dive in head first.