Tag Archives: business

Political culture

Woke Salaryman recently posted this comic article in response to comments towards a previous post about workplace ‘politics’. I really like the realism, the clarity and conviction behind their work. I think it is great that they call out the naivety of those who thinks that they can be ‘above’ politics at work but I’m writing this post because I want to add a more nuance layer to the conversation.

I think Singapore, by and large, have always been sensitive to overt kinds of politicking because of the way politics have been portrayed in our history. We take a more superficial view of what politics mean, as though it is all bad and about behaving in deceptive or conniving, self-serving ways.

And in the workplace, we default to thinking that the virtuous approach is simply to bury head and work hard. That can be a great start in a small working team or organisation where visibility isn’t really a problem. It also works well when productivity, key work metrics are not contentious. Then politicking can seem like it’s all about bootlicking, gossiping and acting in the worse, socially destructive ways.

Politics, which is derived from greek words meaning ‘affairs of a city’ is fundamentally relating to governance and interactions between fellow beings living in the same environment, subject to different constraints and influences that are interdependent on one another in the community. The relationship-building, social interactions, tussle for power, influence or mind-share are all part of it. In a workplace, where we are all coming together to achieve something together, it takes effort and the meta-layer of ‘work’ to organise everyone together.

Work today has evolved and become increasingly complex; it is hard to measure individual effort easily, and particularly challenging to identify precisely what the right skillsets are to progress to the next level. It is ultimately the ability to organise others and persuade them to work together that produces value as opposed to working and contributing directly.

There is a role for politics in all of lives, and maybe Singapore needs to build a culture of politcal-awareness and also encourage citizens to appreciate the positive role it can play in society, workplaces. And we may all also learn the right social, emotional intellect needed to handle tricky situations. With the geopolitical climate of the world today, Singapore needs to cultivate more brilliant diplomats than ever before. How else to do so than to help our people recognise the value of such work to the survival and success of a city state nation.

Driven by inspiration

If you think that Singaporeans were motivated by fear to build up our country in early days of nationhood, think again. There wasn’t really all that much to fear because we didn’t have much to begin with. This narrative that we had no resources, we had to rely on our manpower, and our ingenuity, that’s all true but it wasn’t translating into fear for our forefathers. We had it wrong to think that Lee Kuan Yew fearmongered two generations of Singaporeans into the building up a metropolis we have today.

I believe the early Singaporeans were driven by inspiration – the ‘against all odds’ was possible because it was well worth a shot. We didn’t have much to lose; and there was everything to gain on the table. We had institutions to build, and a new identity. How exciting! And of course, we do not slacken, we are not complacent, because we were not there yet – we were limited only by our ability to envision the future and inspire our countrymen towards it.

Fast-forward today, we seem to think that we managed to achieve all that we did out of fear. We think it was ‘kiasuism’ (fear of losing) that drove us. Probably not. What was there to lose anyways; and yes we are competitive because we want to win, not because we are afraid of losing. Being afraid of losing only happens when you have won at least once. And we did win, more than once, and we begin to hold on to our victories and achievements more than our vision of the future. And in fact, this vision of the future morph, and then slipped.

Consider this press release by the Singapore government in November 1988, there seem to be a clear policy and longer term strategy underpinned by a theoretical framework of the economy. There was a deep understanding of what it means for our economy to grow and the structure by which it is expected to grow with. But without a clear sense of vision for what we want to build Singapore into, we will fall into the trap of just trying to push certain figures up indefinitely.

Ten years ago, in 2015, Ravi Menon sketched out some kind of economic vision for the future framed in a retrospective 100th year anniversary speech for Singapore in 2065. It is brilliant and perhaps reflects Ravi’s aptitude for such high level strategic thinking and visioning. If we look at the decade of performance that took place after the speech was made, I’d say things have not been kind to the world and Singapore in terms of geopolitics. That’s perhaps something Ravi did not anticipate and would not have been expected to identify as a challenge for Singapore.

In the next five decades, our nation will be confronted with lots of geopolitical challenges and turmoil in the world; our economy will require more radical thinking and transformation than the country has ever had to go through. But we can only get through it with inspiration, not fear. We can only be driven by the desire to create a future we want to live in, rather than to react to the world’s situation with the classic ‘bo-pian’ attitude that we might find more common amongst our people.

Policy crowding out

Is job creation the responsibility of the government or businesses/entrepreneurs?

Sure, most governments in capitalistic democracies work hard to reduce red tape, improve ease of doing business and provide all kinds of support to businesses. But can policies to create jobs end up crowding out the private sector activities that create jobs, perhaps even undermining the private sector activities?

For example, when EDB in Singapore attracts MNCs that comes into Singapore and starts hiring, providing good and stable jobs, do they end up disincentivising prospective entrepreneurs from starting their own business? Do they also bid up the cost of strong junior hires for the local companies that need them more? Do the companies that comes into the Singapore market compete out local firms who may have been able to perform the same services in the local economy?

Is there a risk that existing investments in the market hold-hostage our domestic policies? Take, for example, the oil & gas industry in Singapore; do its presence slow down our climate policy? Would the fact that government is busy attracting companies and making things smoother for them cause them to compete more effectively with other local companies who may not have that same support from our own government?

Just bringing up the questions worth pondering over. I’ve no answers but I think it’s worth actually looking into actual data and finding ways to understand some of the answers to these questions I’ve raised.

Energy companies of the future

When I started more than 10 years ago in the infrastructure sector focusing on environmental solutions, I saw a lot of new energy startups. A lot of them were facing difficulty on the capital front because all the wealth of the energy sector is tied up in Oil & Gas or the traditional utilities. The startups needed to access regulated infrastructure, regulated markets as well as capital in order to scale but it was difficult. The incumbents were gate-keeping.

So I came to this conclusion that nurturing startups in the energy space wasn’t so much about forming the next unicorn or tech-giant equivalents. It was about strengthening the incumbents; and that these startups are ultimately finding a match in terms of strategic investors in the incumbents in order to exit or to find their innovations adopted through the value chain.

Even for the commercial & industrial, behind-the-meter type solutions, I had in mind that the traditional incumbents would still win out because of their brands and stability.

Turns out that these became areas where they tend to beat a strategic retreat. Because it was too difficult. The big guys had a couple of things they wanted to sell; and they sure could provide some service in order to sell those electrons or molecules. They would even invest in some hardware on your site such as a metering system, or some tanks and nozzles, etc.

But once things got complex, where they have to manage some operations (even virtual ones), and liability at the customers’ sites, it became too difficult. They also think it’s too small, so they left it to whom they believe would be the small guys.

Now it took a long time but these were still difficult projects for the small guys! The EPC players, system integrators, tech solution providers had to come together, get into the complexities of energy service contracting and setting up new operation protocol to get projects up. Slowly they came up; sometimes with investments from the cashflow of these contracting firms, sometimes from family offices and rich borrowers. Financial innovation sort of quickly caught up to support this.

The resulting model, as it turns out, is more of a fund structure where capital is raised in a vehicle that will deploy capital into those energy-as-a-service projects. There is basically an increasing specialisation in the capital-heavy versus labour/technical-heavy segments of the industry. The market is still struggling to understand whether these C&I type energy assets (be it a new chiller/cooler, some kind of tech-enabled energy management systems, or just a set of solar panels with battery energy storage system) is considered infrastructure. Nevertheless, they see it as riskier than traditional state-granted concession type of infrastructure, but still safer than privatw equity where the money is put into operating companies without committed long-term revenues.

Now, I want to address the segment of the market that is also dealing in utility scale renewable power. The end of market moves and financial innovations seem to also point towards a fund structure. Whether it is Equis Energy (now Vena) or even Brookfield Infrastructure that started off in more traditional infrastructure, a whole lot of large scale renewable projects are eventually funded and operated by funds.

I would have imagined that funds would be taking over the more traditional parts of the sectors but instead, what we are really seeing is that funds have become the vehicle for transiting into a new energy system of the world. Is this just an interim solution or do we expect funds to become the energy companies of the future?

Advancement through dilemmas

As I ponder over the paradoxes of our society and nature, I begin to see more and more how our traditional linear paradigms about advancement and growth jars too much against reality.

There are many things that appears contradictory and yet continue to co-exist peacefully in the world without apparent conflict except in our minds. There are tyrants who are charismatic, loved and admired but also incompetent democratically elected leaders who could set a country back by decades. And there are both decentralised and centralised systems that appear to thrive, and also implode.

We ask ourselves if history proceeds through its course regardless of individual’s actions and it is just collective macro force created by the tiny actions of every individual that matters, or that it progresses through the agency of a few, put in the positions of power and influence? It’s not clear at all.

So when we think that progress in the system involves maturity of technology, of having regulation, standardisation, proper rules of engagement in place, we also recognise that these things stifles innovation and block new, emergent contenders from taking over incumbent structures.

Similarly, having contending standards or technology pathways look as though they are going to create a gridlock that prevents the industry from adopting a single unified approach.

The western, perhaps Anglo-Saxon, thought models make it difficult to hold those juxtaposing, contradictory ideas together because it supposes that there is just this one way that is the right way.

What if that is not reality at all?

Experience curve development

I wrote about experience curve pricing and how China executed it as their industrial policy and successfully developed dominance in several sectors. It is hard work, and it takes a lot out of the economy, but it pays off subsequently.

The problem with Singapore is that we keep hitting up our scale limits. When we successfully bet on the right industries that have incredible growing demand, we end up expanding to our space and resource limits that we have to cede our dominance to others.

One good example was the manufacturing of actuators for hard disks. Singapore once had almost 70% market share for the production of that. Imagine that the majority of hard disks used in the world’s PCs had actuators that were manufactured in Singapore. But as the demand expanded significantly, companies like Toshiba, Seagate-Maxtor which had plants in Singapore faced a problem – they didn’t have enough space to add additional lines in their manufacturing facilities in Singapore. Of course, cost of manpower was also rising – and so they started to set their sights on other ASEAN markets for these manufacturing activities.

Singapore just had to keep going up the value chain; and it gets harder and harder to be able to bet on the right products that had good growth or stable demand externally. Most of the time, these demand were captured by the international companies first, and then when they set up their supply base in Singapore, they are effectively bringing that demand to Singapore. That was how we expanded our economy and ‘created’ markets for our economy.

There were still Singapore businesses which were successful in finding opportunities overseas and managed to capture demand externally. But how many of them were actually creating manufacturing in Singapore? How many of them actually brought most of their supply chain through our economy? It was probably quite limited because Singapore was either too expensive or simply not efficient to run them through Singapore. Besides, Singapore doesn’t even have much integrated full-scale supply chains within the country – we are merely one of the stops or churning out one particular part, or assembling some of the components for something much bigger eventually.

So, the experience curve strategy may not work well in Singapore. Yet what then could have that same sort of sticky effect that Singapore’s development can run on? What can generate persistent advantages that are self-reinforcing, without relying on a massive scale, and that do not hit up against our scale limits? We used to sell our ability to integrate and coordinate, but in my opinion, we will run up against it due to increasing size and increasingly siloed areas of specialisation. Besides, that advantage is limited to the government departments.

I think we are lacking focus when it comes to finding a particular niche that we can get into, which initially does not have sufficient scale but could be stewarded into success. It could be focusing on being excellent in a small area which has some natural scale limits in the global markets yet able to fit under the natural limits in Singapore. It could be in making something technically sophisticated that forms a small component of something that many other parts of the world will use for producing everything else. And then organising ourselves to make sure we truly dominate in that space – through strong lobbying and advocacy efforts in other countries and marketing ourselves strongly towards whoever is the end or intermediate users who have the ability to influence and bring that end-demand to Singapore.

We only need a basket of those areas of excellence and strong value proposition to fill our economy and survive. But I may be wrong about it.

Blunting policies II

I wrote about the government blunting their policies previously when it comes to SME grants, particularly in Singapore. The same applies to many countries where policy directions are not just unclear but constantly changing. In the energy transition world, so many projects and companies in the US were taking investment decisions on the basis of tax credits for production of renewable energy.

So when the fate of the tax credits was suddenly called into question, it massively derailed the plans of these companies and projects, resulting in a whole sector or industrial sub-segment seizing up. I have always thought it’s incredible that in Europe and US, you could build an entire business or project based on revenues that are only possible because of subsidies or government tax credits. That’s amazing to me because in Asia, companies do not rely on government subsidies to build their business cases. At least not the private companies who have no political influence.

The reason for that is that the private sector is unwilling to take a lot of the regulatory risks from the Asian government, and they are not sure about the longevity of those policies and incentives. They recognise that when leadership changes, these incentives could disappear (as it happened in the US most recently). In other words, those policy measures in Asia are actually pretty blunt because the private sector is not going to respond to it much. US government risk that happening and losing such a precious lever to influence the economy and coordinate the change that is required.

Likewise, in Singapore, one of the biggest advantage that the government have is the ability to coordinate change properly. Technically, they don’t need to use market-based mechanisms to do that, but decades of indoctrination about the need to use free-market capitalism to ensure efficiency have brought us to the approach taken these days. The topic of subsidies is tricky and often at the top level, the thinking is ‘who would not want subsidies and freebies for their business?’ Yet in practice, it is not so easy. But it is not the bureaucracy that companies are unwilling to engage with – it is the uncertainty around the discretion of agencies’ decisions on whether some company or activity merits the funding.

Often, if the government’s grants or subsidies are uncertain and criteria are flexibly applied to accept or reject applications, then companies would rather focus on dealing with the vicissitudes of the market than of the government. I’m writing these because I feel that our agencies could inadvertently undermine something precious that the government have built up in the past. The full implications can only be seen and experience when it’s probably too late.

Blunting policies I

I started my first serious job with the Singapore government over a decade ago. Before that, I worked variously in education (math and economics tutor, and teaching assistant for undergraduates), as a freelance writer for a local economics magazine, and water treatment systems (B2C and B2B sales of drinking water filters and treatment units).

But I’ve been thinking about government policies and the institutions required to build a strong economy for almost two decades. This is partly because I was influenced by Dr Goh Keng Swee’s achievements to study economics. In particular, I thought a lot about industrial policies and the approaches taken for that in Singapore.

I was subsequently part of IE Singapore, and then Enterprise Singapore. They were agencies that provided grants to local companies for various activities. To avoid ‘picking winners’ in terms of selecting particular sectors to support, most of these incentive policies are broad sweeping – they were targeted at investments that enhanced productivity such as supporting automation, digitisation, etc. Sustainability was recently a key theme for some of these incentive schemes.

As I’ve been out of the system for a long time, my views are not based on what I know from inside the system but observations made from conversations with businesses on the outside. In all of these incentive schemes, there’s a strong emphasis on governance so the process takes a bit of time. Companies are encouraged to go ahead with their plans while the grant application is in process. This plays the role of reducing risks of delays to the companies’ plans but it also mean that the companies faces uncertainty on the final outlay/expenses that the government would cover.

The government exercises a significant amount of discretion when approving grants. This is a conclusion arrived at by consulting and digital service solution providers to the Small-medium Enterprises (SMEs) with solutions or services that were supported by the grants.

What eventually happens as a result is that incentive schemes by the government becomes weaker and weaker as a tool to encourage companies to take up new solutions or move in the direction of the government. In the short run, when government pushes out incentives to help SMEs with payment systems, or improve their marketing, or even start R&D, the SMEs will definitely start looking into this areas thinking it’s their chance to defray some of their costs of making such improvements and getting more competitive advantage. Some may even realise they should go into it with or without grant support. But a majority of them would not look deep enough to make that decision – instead, they’ll make the decision contingent on the availability of support. When their applications are either denied or the amount granted falls short of their expectations, a certain trust in the government is broken.

The next time these grants or incentives are peddled around, they no longer respond to them. They are skeptical about the government’s sincerity. This is especially if they had experienced cases where the rejection comes through technical grounds or when they expected a particular expense to be eligible due to vague policy wording, but eventually the agency exercised discretion to deny it.

In the long run, these policies gets more and more blunt, and public servants will be spending so much effort thinking about the policies, setting up governance procedures, only to realise that uptake of these incentives are poor. I wonder how much governments realise this is actually a problem for longer term policy-making and economic levers. As much as they try to use market-oriented levers, some of these intangible factors make a huge difference.

All about energy transition

I’ve been fighting against the prevailing culture for the past decade of my career. And for those who blame things on culture and act like it cannot be changed, they are being delusional. I have a few examples to show:

  • How did we get from flagging for a cab on the street to punching our mobile phone screens to hail a cab?
  • How did we get from ‘solar power’ is too inefficient and there is not enough space in Singapore to targeting a 2GWp solar by 2030?
  • How did we get from being in kampongs where we helped each other and lived for generations in a house to thinking that our financial lives depend on getting BTO, then selling it after MOP and then upgrading non-stop over our adulthood?

While it takes time, culture can be changed. It also takes identifying some loose bricks in the existing edifice to overhaul the structure of our prevailing culture. Energy transition is one tough one to crack, but that said, our region in Southeast Asia has already moved quite a bit from the days of coal-fired power generation. Yes there was a bit of attempts to catch on with the hype around hydrogen but the dollars and sense prevailed at least for now.

So I’ve been toying with the idea of doing a lot more content to teach all of us about energy transition and to be able to learn together. There is a whole lot of de-stigmatising, trying things out, and unlearning our previous biases to be able to move the culture a bit and accelerate the transition. There’s a question of format, level of engagement, how to manage and nurture a community and so on. I guess I’ll have to dive in head first.

Rethinking business moats

Popularised by Warren Buffett, the idea of business moats is simply some kind of persistence or stickiness in demand that businesses have, which can keep them going. Basically it is really anything that helps to reduce competition to a business. This is important in the real world though we tend to celebrate competition in economics. Business moats are actually necessary for innovation, and avoiding a race to the bottom.

Moats are largely about maintenance of a profit margin. The stronger the moat, the higher the margin would be but having a moat itself makes a lot of difference. In fact, we tend to worry in economics about moats because we think it creates high margins. That’s not always true. You could have low margins as a moat itself – because being able to keep your costs low would keep competitors at bay. The point of moats is more about the persistence of the margin.

The most significant problem with competition is that you are in a dynamic environment that keeps you on your toes. Now you may think that is a good thing. But if we keep having to compete with competitors who are just diverting your customers easily through one-off gimmicks and popping up in different places, dislodging your margins here and there, it is not going to make a significant dent in your profits, but it certainly takes up your attention and ability to consider longer-term growth and innovation.

It is such long-term thinking that a business moat creates, which can support the maturing of a system. Yes, other institutional factors contribute to the growth and development of markets. But pure ‘perfect competition’ in the manner it is traditionally thought isn’t one of them. Many developed countries and markets have that sort of dynamism and competition. Just go to a weekday market in a mid-sized town in Africa. But that in itself does not produce the sort of progress that capitalism is touted to produce.

What underlies the success of market capitalism is ultimately the ability not just to accumulate capital but to be freed of that savage competition to engage in more medium to long-term strategic competition. And that is enabled by business moats.