business Archives - Page 17 of 17

Nobel Agents

In the field of the sciences, research and achievements at the cutting edge is often poorly understood by High School (or Junior College) students. Take for example this year’s Nobel Prize for Physics; it was given to physicist Charles Kao, “for groundbreaking achievements concerning the transmission of light in fibers for optical communication” and two other physicist “for the invention of an imaging semiconductor circuit – the CCD sensor”.

Not many of us actually concern ourselves with the workings of the CCD sensor (it’s something found in digital cameras) nor optical communications and I’m sure pre-college education focuses on none of that. Students who are really interested in Physics might not be able to directly draw links between the inventions and discoveries made by the Nobel Laureates and the stuff he reads or study about. The maturity of a subject like Physics almost definitely ensures that stuff studied at the forefront is highly specialized and in some sense, narrow.

On the other hand, economics is more accessible than it appears to be. The Nobel Prize for Economics this year was awarded to economists (Oliver E. Williamson) “for his analysis of economic governance, especially the boundaries of the firm”; and (Elinor Ostrom) “for her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons”. It is interesting to note that both of these economists are studying workings of important economic agencies (or agents) outside the workings of the traditional market mechanisms.

The prize rightly demonstrates a heightened appreciation of economics as a subject to study cost-benefits and incentives rather than one that scrutinizes money. Posner neatly summarizes Williamson’s work and its implications in his entry while Becker discuss the inherent difficulties in real world organizations on Becker-Posner Blog. It should be easy for a JC student with background in economics to realize the link between Williamson’s work and the stuff he/she is studying after reading Posner’s entry. It is the ability to draw this link that reflects how much of a science the study of economics actually is – the basic principles of incentives, cost-benefits analysis all applies even when there might not be the perfect information or perfect rationality in the real world.

Irreducible Uncertainty

The Straits Times caught my attention again the week before with a particular article by Robert Skidelsky, which was a contribution to Project Syndicate. In Keynes versus the Classics: Round 2, Skidelsky highlighted the problem with today’s Keynesians being unwilling to work out the implications of irreducible uncertainty for economic theory. The article was essentially a response to the two economist, Krugman (his article) and Cochrane (his response here and here) who are engaging in an academic quarrel of sorts.

Krugman started out criticising the love for elegant economic theories of classical (implicitly speaking, Chicago school) economists. And Cochrane shot back, arguing that to attribute excessive fluctuations in the market to ‘irrationality’ is theoretical nihilism. And we all know that all that buying and selling has got motivations behind them even if these were results of false information, pure emotional preferences. I like Skidelsky’s analogy about the theater on fire (which might have been used previously by other economists as well):

It’s like what happens in a crowded theater if someone shouts “Fire!” Everyone rushes to get out. This is not “irrational” behavior. It is reasonable behavior in the face of uncertainty.

I’m not sure if Robert Skidelsky is a Post-Keynesian like Hyman Minsky but his extensive research into John M Keynes has brought him to write several volumes about this economist once touted as a saviour of capitalism. In any case, I believe Keynes simply sprinkled some important ideas that are pertinent to our study of the economy and there is definitely a need for further studies into the insights of Keynes about our modern capitalist economy and possible save it from itself once again.

Positive Feedback

The economy doesn’t (always) tend towards equilibrium as classical economics textbooks suggests. But things are worst when things tend towards an equilibrium that doesn’t benefit the society in general, many social phenomena that I’ve described in a previous post. The social/market forces are pushing the situation towards something no one wants; without an authority mandating stuff, no one have the incentive to help reach the collectively beneficial outcome.

In a recent article by James Surowiecki in The New Yorker, he discusses how success of big banks builds upon success and bring about the mega big banks that results in a concentrated banking system. It is thus possible that we allowed banks to grow big and stay so because the market naturally tends towards that and we have problems assessing the welfare gains from increasing bank sizes, as suggested by Surowiecki:

The trouble is that the “market” for banking is so distorted—by switching costs, by government subsidies and guarantees, and by the banks’ market power—that it’s hard to know whether big banks are adding value or are simply exploiting their oligopolistic positions.

The only problem that we know with the concentrated banking system is that they increase financial risk. That being said, regulations will have to start moving towards managing the risk that is contained in the financial system and if this really do result in policies that have to limit the size of banks then so be it. The government is the only one who can act as a dam holding up the floodwaters of market forces.